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Abstract 
Individuals’ short- and long-term goals can influence the constructive nature of 
autobiographical memory recall.  The overarching aim of this dissertation was to examine 
how emotion regulation goals in particular might modulate autobiographical recall at 
both a behavioral and neural level.  In Chapter 1, a new behavioral task instructed 
individuals to cognitively reappraise the emotions associated with negative and positive 
events.  Results revealed that such emotion regulation goals influence the emotional and 
other subjective experiences associated with recall, such that up-regulation instructions 
were linked to greater reported levels of emotional intensity, sensory detail, and 
recollection (e.g., reliving), and vice-versa for down-regulation instructions.  In Chapter 
2, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used as participants were 
instructed to decrease, increase, or maintain the emotions associated with negative 
autobiographical events.  Decreasing emotional intensity primarily engaged neural 
activity in regions previously implicated in cognitive control (e.g., dorsal and ventral 
lateral prefrontal cortex), emotion generation and processing (e.g., amygdala, insula), and 
visual imagery (e.g., precuneus) during an early phase of recall as participants searched 
for and retrieved events.  In contrast, increasing emotional intensity engaged similar 
regions as individuals prepared to recall negative events (i.e., before a memory cue was 
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presented) and again as they later elaborated upon the details of the events they had 
recalled.  In Chapter 3, individual differences in habitual use of cognitive reappraisal 
were measured and their relation to neural activity during autobiographical recall was 
examined.  Results revealed that, even when not explicitly instructed to reappraise, 
habitual use of reappraisal was broadly associated with neural activity in cognitive 
control regions (e.g., dorsal and ventral lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex) as well as emotion processing regions (e.g., amygdala, insula) across memories 
that varied in their emotionality and specificity.  Taken together, these results suggest that 
short- and long-term emotion regulation goals can influence the construction of 
autobiographical memories on both behavioral and neural levels.   
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Introduction 
Autobiographical memory (AM) encompasses our memories for specific, 
personally-relevant episodes that are recalled from the unique perspective of the self 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Though once thought to be stored as exact replicas 
of an event‘s occurrence, there are now decades of research demonstrating that AMs are 
reconstructed at recall, beginning with Bartlett‘s (1932) observation that an individuals‘ 
existing contexts influenced the omissions and additions of details in the recall of 
narratives.  One of the most influential models of the constructive nature of AM was put 
forth by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) in their proposal of the self-memory system 
(SMS). Autobiographical knowledge in the SMS is thought to be organized 
hierarchically. The most general information is located at the top of the hierarchy in the 
form of lifetime periods (e.g., ―When I was in high school‖). Located within these broad 
themes—at the intermediate level of the hierarchy—is general event knowledge. General 
events can take the form of either repeated categories of events (e.g., ―Homeroom every 
morning‖) or temporally extended events that last longer than a day (e.g., ―Finals week 
during senior year‖). General events index information at the lowest level of the 
hierarchy: event specific knowledge (ESK). ESK consists of the specific sensory, 
perceptual, and emotional details that are associated with events that are unique to time 
and place (e.g., ―The time I was late to homeroom‖).  
Importantly, access to most of ESK is lost shortly after an event ends, leading to a 
reliance on more general AMs or schemas to fill in the gaps of what occurred (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and even how what occurred made us feel (Robinson & Clore, 
2 
 
2002). Critically, the construction of AMs in the SMS does not occur randomly. Instead, 
event construction can be guided and modulated by the construct known as the ―working 
self‖ in the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The working self is analogous to the 
working memory system, and includes the set of short- and long-term goals that are 
currently self-relevant.  
The working self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) has an important, 
bidirectional relationship with the autobiographical knowledge database (Conway, 2005). 
On the one hand, the knowledge contained in the database of our experiences restricts 
how we view ourselves (Conway, 2005). On the other hand, the goals maintained by the 
working self also restrict access to information stored in the autobiographical knowledge 
database (Conway, 2005). For example, the chronic goal of maintaining a coherent sense 
of self across time might modulate accessibility to particular AMs, such that those AMs 
most in line with our self-concept are more likely to be recalled (Conway, 2005; Woike, 
Gershkovich, Piorkowski, & Polo, 1999). Goals within the working self can also distort 
the construction of AM details so as to ensure that the recalled memory does not threaten 
those goals (Conway, 2005).  
Although Conway (2005) primarily focuses on the goal of maintaining a stable 
self-identity over time, the working self contains all of the short- and long-term goals that 
are presently relevant and active and therefore can modulate the construction of AMs 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005). In this thesis, I propose that emotion 
regulation goals fit within this definition of the working self, such that attempts to 
regulate one‘s emotions can influence the construction of AMs.  Emotion regulation can 
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be defined as ―the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, 
when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions‖ (Gross, 
1998, p. 275).  Though there is any number of potential strategies that individuals can use 
to regulate their emotions (Gross, 1998), a strategy known as cognitive reappraisal has 
traditionally been paid the greatest attention in the emotion regulation literature (see 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008, for review) and will be the main focus in this thesis.  
Cognitive reappraisal involves the reinterpretation of emotional information so as to alter 
its impact (e.g., Ochsner & Gross, 2005); this strategy is known to be effective in 
reducing both behavioral emotion ratings and physiological responses to emotional 
information (Gross & Thompson, 2007) and its chronic use in everyday life is associated 
with higher ratings of subjective well-being (Gross & John, 2003).  
Emotion regulation goals can direct autobiographical recall via at least two routes 
(see Holland & Kensinger, 2010, for review).  The first route involves event selection 
(i.e., when any events can be recalled, which events are chosen?). Evidence for event 
selection comes primarily from the literature on mood incongruent memory, which 
occurs, for example, when individuals choose to recall a positive memory to repair a 
negative mood (Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996; Parrott & Sabini, 1993).  
The second route is a more effortful form of goal-directed recall (see Joormann, 
Cooney, Henry, & Gotlib, 2012, for similar discussion) that takes advantage of the 
constructive nature of AM.  This route involves modulating the construction of the details 
or content associated with particular events in such a way as to increase or decrease 
emotional intensity (Pasupathi, 2003) and is relatively understudied compared to the 
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event selection route.  Some prior evidence suggests that regulatory goals can influence 
the content or details that are included in narratives about past events (Holland, Tamir, & 
Kensinger, 2010).  However, as I discuss in Chapter 1, an event‘s content is only one 
component of AM recall, leaving open the question of whether emotion regulation goals 
can influence the emotional intensity and other subjective experiences (e.g., vividness) 
that are associated with the construction of autobiographical events.  The time course 
over which emotion regulation goals might influence memory is also unclear; AM recall 
is not a unitary process and involves an early search and retrieval phase (referred to here 
as the ―memory onset‖ phase) as well as a later phase during which the details of the 
retrieved memory are elaborated upon (e.g., Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, & Whitecross, 
2001).  In Chapter 2, I discuss an experiment in which I utilize functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine whether the processes engaged, and the time 
course over which they are engaged, are similar when individuals are instructed to 
increase and to decrease emotions. 
 As noted, the construct of the working self is thought to include not only the 
short-term, ―in the moment‖ goals that are examined via emotion regulation tasks in 
which participants receive explicit cognitive reappraisal instructions (see Chapters 1 and 
2), but also long-term goals that are related to stable individual differences (Conway, 
2005).  Indeed, individuals can vary in their habitual use of various emotion regulation 
strategies, including cognitive reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003), leaving open the 
question of how such chronic goals might influence the onset and elaboration phases of 
AM recall.  In Chapter 3, I consider how the neural correlates of AMs that vary in their 
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emotionality and specificity are influenced by individual differences in the reported use 
of cognitive reappraisal. 
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Chapter 1 
Effects of Cognitive Reappraisal on the Phenomenology of Autobiographical 
Memory 
Introduction 
 Recalling emotional experiences can re-invoke in the present the emotions 
experienced at the time of an event‘s occurrence (Brewer, Doughtie, & Lubin, 1980; 
Westermann, Kordelia, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996), yet we are not passive recipients of these 
emotions and may try to change or modify them upon recall (Holland & Kensinger, 
2010).  Indeed, a deficit in regulating emotions about past events is a hallmark of 
affective disorders including depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Lanius et al., 2010), and anxiety disorders (Turk et al., 2005).  Although there 
are many strategies that individuals can use to regulate their emotions (Gross, 1998), one 
of the most effective is cognitive reappraisal, when individuals reinterpret information so 
as to change its emotional impact (Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
Emotion regulation goals are often hedonic in nature (i.e., decreasing negative or 
increasing positive emotions; Tamir & Gross, 2011), such as when we vividly recall a 
past success to maintain a positive self-image (D‘Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008).  
However, emotion regulation goals can also be non-hedonic in contexts where increasing 
negative or decreasing positive emotions is useful (see review by Tamir, 2009), such as 
when we recall an insult to increase anger and facilitate performance in a competition 
(Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008).   
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 The constructive nature of autobiographical memory (AM; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) allows the recall of specific episodes to be guided by personally-relevant 
goals (Conway, 2005).  The construction of AMs may permit for the modulation of event 
details and appraisals in such a way as to increase or decrease emotions (Ochsner & 
Schacter, 2003; Pasupathi, 2003).  To this point, this possibility has primarily been 
examined in investigations of how individuals remember the emotional intensity 
experienced during past events (see Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Levine et al., 2006; 
Ochsner & Schacter, 2003, for reviews).  For example, individuals can construe or 
reappraise information about their past feelings or their partner‘s traits to maintain or 
promote positive affect regarding that relationship (Murray & Holmes, 1993; Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990), and recalling negative relationship events with lower 
emotional intensity has been linked to higher marital satisfaction (Alea & Vick, 2010).  
Individuals may also recall the past as more negative than it was (based on past on-line 
emotion ratings) to perceive improvement over time (e.g., Karney & Coombs, 2000; 
McFarland, Ross, & DeCourville, 1989; Ross, 1989).     
In addition to influencing how the emotions and emotional intensity associated 
with events can be recalled, emotion regulation goals may also influence the details or 
content of what is recalled.  We examined this possibility by telling research participants 
that they would be meeting with an emotional experimenter (Holland, Tamir, & 
Kensinger, 2010); invoking such expectations in individuals can motivate them to 
regulate their emotions to match the mood of the emotional person (Huntsinger et al., 
2009).  Individuals who thought they would be meeting with a sad experimenter 
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increased the amount of negative emotional language they used in reporting past events, 
in comparison to a baseline recall of the same events from two weeks before; those who 
thought they would be meeting with a happy experimenter demonstrated the opposite 
trend (Holland et al., 2010).   
 Taken together, this prior work suggests that regulatory goals and recall can be 
intertwined, but it does not address the question of whether emotion regulation goals 
influence the subjective qualities experienced at the time of recall.  For example, 
although emotion regulation has been invoked as an explanation for changes in emotion 
ratings or memory content (e.g., Holland et al., 2010), previous experiments have 
generally not instructed participants to regulate their emotions or measured whether the 
supposed regulatory attempts resulted in decreased or increased emotional experience.  
Although most work in the AM literature has focused on memory content, the 
phenomenology of recall, including emotional, recollective, and sensory experiences, is a 
fundamental component of autobiographical recall (Conway, 2001; D‘Argembeau, Van 
der Linden, d‘Acremont, & Mayers, 2006; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Wheeler, 
Stuss, & Tulving, 1997).  Just as current self-relevant goals can influence memory 
content at retrieval, they may also influence the phenomenology associated with recall 
(Libby & Eibach, 2002; Sutin & Robins, 2008; Thomsen, Scnieber, & Olesen, 2011).   
The emotional nature of AM (Conway, 2003) can modulate the subjective 
qualities of recall, leaving open the possibility that attempts to change the emotions 
associated with memories would also influence those subjective qualities.  Participants 
rate positive events as having more sensory-perception and contextual details than 
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negative or neutral events (D‘Argembeau et al., 2003), and the recall of positive events 
has been linked to a greater sense of re-experiencing (D‘Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004).  An investigation of adults‘ memories for the fall of the Berlin Wall revealed that 
those who felt negative about the event reported less emotion and reliving of the event 
upon recall than those who felt positive (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007).  Evidence for such 
valence effects is mixed, however; some investigations have found little difference in the 
subjective qualities of negative and positive events (Bohanek, Fivush, & Walker, 2005; 
Comblain, D‘Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005).  One possibility is that the 
emotional intensity associated with an event may be more predictive of the subjective 
experience at recall than an event‘s valence (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004).  
Regardless of how negative or positive events were, Talarico et al. (2004) found that 
greater emotional intensity predicted greater subjective experiences of recollection and 
sensory detail.   
The goals of the present experiment were two-fold:  (a) to modify a cognitive 
reappraisal task in which individuals are explicitly instructed to reappraise emotional 
images (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004; Urry et al., 2006; Phan et al., 
2005; Goldin et al., 2008; reviewed by Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008) for use with AMs, 
and (b) to determine whether reappraising the emotions associated with negative and 
positive AMs influences the subjective qualities of recall.  We asked participants to make 
baseline ratings of the subjective qualities associated with a number of negative, positive, 
and neutral events, and then to reappraise and re-rate the same events after a 1-week 
delay.  We used a subset of rating scales from the Autobiographical Memory 
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Questionnaire (AMQ; e.g., Rubin, Burt, & Fifield, 2003; Talarico et al., 2004; see 
Appendix A) to assess the subjective qualities of recall.  The AMQ is similar to the 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) 
and contains questions meant to query the emotional, recollective, and sensory 
components of recall (Rubin et al., 2003), described in more detail below. 
Emotional Qualities.  We assessed self-reports of the valence and intensity of 
participants‘ negative, positive, and neutral events to determine whether the emotions 
associated with events could be influenced by reappraisal instructions.  We predicted that 
emotional intensity ratings would increase during up-regulation and decrease during 
down-regulation, in line with prior reappraisal studies using emotional images or film 
clips (reviewed by Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008).  In addition, we expected that hedonic 
reappraisal (i.e., decreasing negative, increasing positive) would lead to increases in 
positivity ratings, whereas non-hedonic reappraisal (i.e., increasing negative, decreasing 
positive) would lead to increases in negativity ratings about events. 
 We also assessed the extent to which individuals felt they were currently 
experiencing the same emotions, and to the same intensity, as the emotions they 
experienced during the original event.  This allowed us to explore whether decreasing or 
increasing emotions would influence the perceived match between the recalled and 
current emotional experience.  Although it might seem that reappraisal instructions would 
result in a greater disconnect between current and past emotions because they ask people 
to change how they feel, it is possible that this change would actually move participants 
closer to the emotion state they originally felt.  For instance, while up-regulating negative 
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affect, participants might move themselves into a highly emotional state more similar to 
the intense state they experienced at the time of the original event. 
Sensory Qualities.  A sense of vividly recalling the sensory—particularly 
visual—details of an event is a hallmark feature of AM (e.g., Brewer, 1996; Rubin & 
Kozin, 1984; Wright & Gaskell, 1992; Rubin, 2005), so much so that damage to visual 
imagery regions of the brain can result in amnesia (Greenberg, Eacott, Brechin, & Rubin, 
2005; Rubin & Greenberg, 1998).  Visual imagery and emotional experience are tightly 
coupled:  Greater emotional intensity has been linked to greater subjective sensory detail 
(Talarico et al., 2004), and vivid visual imagery can be used to elicit emotional states (see 
review by Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  Consistent with the idea that imagery can evoke 
emotional states, neuroimaging investigations of cognitive reappraisal in response to 
emotional images have revealed decreased or increased neural activity in imagery-related 
brain regions during the down- or up-regulation of negative emotions, respectively (e.g., 
Ochsner et al., 2004; Urry et al., 2006).  One strategy for increasing emotions toward a 
static image may be imagining oneself as a central figure in an emotional scene and 
enhancing the subjective feeling of experiencing the sensory details associated with that 
scene, and vice-versa for decreasing emotions (Ochsner et al., 2004).  In line with the 
emotion regulation literature, we predicted in the present experiment that vividness 
ratings for emotional AMs would be modulated by reappraisal instructions, such that up-
regulating would be associated with increases in the subjective experience of sensory 
detail and down-regulating with decreases in sensory detail.    
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One specific strategy that individuals may use to enhance or reduce the subjective 
vividness and emotional intensity associated with recall is to modulate the perspective 
from which an event is recalled.   Events can be constructed from either a field (i.e., first 
person) or observer (i.e., third person) perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson, 
1996).  Emotional memories are more likely to be recalled from a field perspective 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; D‘Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003).  Focusing 
on the emotional elements of an event increases the likelihood of recalling an event from 
a field perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983), and being instructed to move from a field to 
observer perspective during recall leads to reduced ratings of emotion (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006).  Adopting an observer perspective may serve as a defense against re-
experiencing the negative emotions associated with stressful or traumatic events 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Sutin & Robins, 2008), and may also reduce the emotional 
intensity associated with positive events (Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Lemogne 
et al., 2006).  Indeed, an observer perspective in general may serve as an emotion 
regulation strategy, with the idea being that, similar to reducing subjective vividness, 
creating physical distance from a scene subsequently creates emotional distance (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2011; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischell, 2005).  We predicted that instructing 
individuals to down-regulate their emotions would lead to more of an observer 
perspective, whereas instructions to up-regulate would lead to more of a field perspective.   
  Recollective Qualities.  AMs are also associated with unique recollective 
qualities upon recall, including senses of reliving an event and mentally travelling back to 
the time when an event occurred (Wheeler et al., 1997), and high confidence in the 
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accuracy of recall (Talarico & Rubin, 2007).  Emotional intensity is positively related to 
the extent to which individuals experience these recollective qualities at the time of recall  
(e.g., Talarico et al., 2004; Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  We therefore predicted that 
decreasing or increasing the emotional intensity of events would dampen or enhance the 
subjective recollective qualities of recall (reliving, mental time travel, and belief in 
accuracy), respectively.      
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-one younger adults (21 female; M = 19.81 years, SD = 1.17 years) took part in this 
experiment.  Three participants were excluded from subsequent data analysis for failing 
to complete the second session of the study, two participants were excluded for revealing 
during debriefing that they had not completed the task as instructed, and one participant 
was excluded due to a technical error in recording his responses.  The final sample 
consisted of 25 participants (19 female; M = 19.72 years, SD = 1.17 years) who had no 
history of psychiatric, neurological, or learning disorders, nor any history or current use 
of psychiatric medication.  Informed consent was obtained from all participants in 
accordance with the Boston College Institutional Review Board. 
Materials 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire.  At two sessions, participants made 
a series of subjective ratings adapted from the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire 
(e.g., Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004; see Appendix A).  The ratings assessed:  (a) the 
emotional qualities of the events (how negative, positive, and intense as they are recalled; 
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similarity in valence and arousal during recall compared to actual occurrence of event); 
(b) the sensory qualities of the events (how vivid, from what visual perspective); and (c) 
the recollective qualities of the events (how much reliving, mental time travel, and belief 
in accuracy).  Each rating was made on a 1 (low) to 7 (high) scale [perspective was rated 
on 1 (outside observer) – 7 (through own eyes) scale].  The rating scales were presented 
on a computer, and participants had a maximum of 12 sec to make each rating. 
Procedure 
Baseline session.  Participants completed a baseline stimulus collection session, 
during which they generated 30 negative, 30 positive, and 10 neutral specific AMs in an 
Excel spreadsheet.  Participants were given lists of example negative, positive, and 
neutral events (following Addis et al., 2009) to help facilitate retrieval, but they were not 
limited to the events on those lists.  The spreadsheet included valence prompts (i.e., 
―Negative,‖ ―Positive,‖ or ―Neutral‖); the order of events followed the pattern of 2 
negative, 2 positive, and 1 neutral to minimize the propagation of any particular mood 
state that might result from recalling a number of consecutive emotional events.  
Immediately after generating an event, participants were instructed to create a short title 
for that event that was just a few words but specific enough that if they were to see that 
title at the subsequent session they would know exactly which event it referenced.  After 
creating a short title, participants wrote a brief sentence describing the event, noted their 
approximate age when the event occurred, and made the AMQ ratings.     
Emotion regulation session.  Following an approximately 7-day delay (M = 6.84 
days, SD = .47 days), participants completed a cognitive reappraisal task adapted from 
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the emotion regulation literature and previously used with normed emotional images or 
film clips (see reviews by Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008).  Participants first received 
extensive instructions and practice with how to reappraise the emotions associated with 
the events.  They were instructed that when they saw the reappraisal instructions to 
―Decrease‖ or ―Increase,‖ they should attempt to re-interpret their AM in such a way as 
to feel a weaker or stronger emotional reaction about the event, respectively, regardless 
of whether it was positive or negative.  On the other hand, when participants saw the 
―Maintain‖ instruction, they were instructed to recall that event as they normally would, 
without trying to alter their emotions about it.  During this task, participants were first 
presented with a reappraisal or maintain instruction paired with the valence of the AM for 
that trial (i.e., Decrease Negative, Increase Negative, Maintain Negative, Decrease 
Positive, Increase Positive, Maintain Positive, Maintain Neutral).   
Following this instruction period, one of the memory titles that participants had 
created at the Baseline Session appeared on the screen underneath the regulation 
instruction.  Participants pressed a keyboard button when they felt they had the fully-
formed memory in mind, and then they continued elaborating on the details of that 
memory in accordance with whatever regulation instructions were given for the 
remainder of a 12 sec trial.  Each trial concluded with the AMQ ratings.  Additionally, 
participants rated how successful they felt they were in changing or maintaining the 
emotions associated with each event on a 1 (not at all successful) to 7 (entirely 
successful) scale.  The emotion regulation trials were presented in a pseudo-random 
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order, such that no more than three of any one instruction or valence were presented 
consecutively to avoid the propagation of any given mood state or regulatory goal.   
Results 
Baseline Session 
Table 1.1.  Means and standard deviations for Time 1 (baseline) 
subjective ratings and ages of negative, positive, and neutral events. 
 Time 1 Ratings 
 Negative 
M (SD) 
Positive 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Negative Emotion 6.10 (0.53) 1.47 (0.49) 2.17 (0.94) 
Positive Emotion 1.43 (0.35) 6.33 (0.60) 3.81 (1.11) 
Intensity 5.35 (0.67) 4.82 (0.91) 2.88 (1.00) 
Same Emotion 5.15 (0.70) 5.39 (0.66) 5.18 (0.95) 
Same Intensity 4.25 (1.16) 4.42 (1.21) 4.62 (1.28) 
Vividness 5.16 (0.79) 5.13 (0.73) 4.15 (0.88) 
Perspective 5.71 (0.88) 5.67 (0.82) 5.62 (0.92) 
Reliving 4.75 (0.92) 4.81 (0.94) 3.82 (0.98) 
Mental Time Travel 4.69 (1.02) 4.70 (1.02) 3.75 (0.99) 
Accuracy 5.70 (0.93) 5.77 (0.85) 5.55 (1.11) 
Age of Memory (years) 3.50 (1.77) 2.87 (1.30) 1.45 (1.10) 
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We first analyzed the baseline AMQ ratings made about the negative, positive, 
and neutral events (see Table 1.1) to determine whether there were any effects of valence 
on the subjective qualities associated with recall.  The average ratings for each AMQ 
question were submitted to repeated-measures ANOVAs using valence (i.e., negative, 
positive, neutral) as a within-subjects factor.  
Baseline emotional qualities.  Examinations of the baseline emotional valence 
ratings confirmed that events recalled in response to the negative, positive, and neutral 
valence prompts differed in the expected directions.  There was a main effect of valence 
for both negative emotion [F(2, 48) = 342.90, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .94] and positive 
emotion [F(2, 48) = 354.74, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .94] ratings.  Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons confirmed that events recalled in response to the negative valence prompt 
were rated as being more negative than events recalled in response to the neutral prompts, 
which were in turn rated as more negative than events recalled in response to the positive 
prompts, ps < .005.  Similarly, events recalled in response to the positive valence prompts 
were rated as more positive than those recalled in response to the neutral valence 
prompts, which were in turn rated as more positive than those recalled in response to the 
negative prompts, ps < .001.    
There was also a main effect of valence on reported emotional intensity, F(2, 48) 
= 98.95, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .81.  Pairwise comparisons confirmed that both negative 
and positive events were rated as more intense than neutral events, ps < .001, and 
negative events were rated as more intense than positive events, p < .005. 
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In terms of self-reported ratings of the extent to which individuals felt at the time 
of recall the same emotions and to the same intensity as they did when the events were 
occurring, there was no effect of valence, ps > .12, partial-ƞ2s < .17. 
Baseline sensory qualities.  There was a main effect of valence on subjective 
ratings of vividness, F(2, 48) = 38.92, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .62.  The main effect was 
driven by significantly higher vividness ratings for emotional than neutral events, ps < 
.001.   
Emotional valence had no effect on the reported perspective from which 
individuals recalled their AMs at the baseline session, p = .82, partial-ƞ2  = .01.  The mean 
perspective rating was on the upper-end of the 7-point scale (> 5.5 for each valence), 
suggesting that events tended to be recalled from more of a field perspective. 
Baseline recollective qualities.  There were main effects of valence for 
subjective ratings of reliving [F(2, 48) = 54.05, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .69] and mental 
time travel [F(2, 48) = 34.44, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .59].  In each case, these main effects 
were driven by significantly higher ratings for emotional than neutral events, ps < .001; 
negative and positive events did not differ from one another, ps > .57.  There was only a 
marginally significant main effect of valence on self-reported event accuracy, F(2, 48) = 
2.51, p = .09, partial-ƞ2 = .10; pairwise comparisons revealed that positive events were 
rated as more accurate than neutral events, p = .03, but reported accuracy did not differ 
between negative and positive nor negative and neutral events, ps > .21. 
Age of events.  There also was a main effect of valence on the age of the 
memories that participants reported (Table 1.1), F(2, 48) = 52.71, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = 
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.69.  Neutral events occurred more recently than either negative or positive events, ps < 
.001; in addition, positive events were slightly more recent than negative events, p = .01. 
Emotion Regulation Session    
Table 1.2.  Mean difference scores (Regulation Session – Baseline Session), Regulation 
Session recall reaction times, and self-reported regulation success for emotional and 
subjective qualities of negative, positive, and neutral AMs.  Standard deviations are 
presented in parentheses. 
 Negative Positive Neutral 
 Decrease Increase Maintain Decrease Increase Maintain Maintain 
Negative Emo -1.06 
(0.78) 
0.14 
(0.48) 
0.00 
(0.69) 
1.00 
(0.77) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
0.02 
(0.71) 
0.01 
(0.86) 
 
Positive Emo 0.96 
(0.65) 
0.09 
(0.59) 
0.21 
(0.48) 
-0.94 
(0.81) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
-0.30 
(0.58) 
0.15 
(1.20) 
 
Intensity -0.65 
(0.85) 
0.16 
(0.56) 
-0.17 
(0.59) 
-0.35 
(0.61) 
0.55 
(0.57) 
-0.03 
(0.57) 
0.16 
(0.63) 
 
Same Emo -0.75 
(0.89) 
0.12 
(0.87) 
0.19 
(0.79) 
-0.72 
(0.77) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
0.07 
(0.85) 
-0.12 
(0.68) 
 
Same Intensity -0.57 
(0.93) 
0.53 
(0.87) 
0.29 
(0.85) 
-0.34 
(1.07) 
0.45 
(1.10) 
0.42 
(0.88) 
0.18 
(0.75) 
 
Vividness -0.14 
(0.84) 
0.43 
(0.58) 
0.07 
(0.69) 
-0.20 
(0.60) 
0.44 
(0.51) 
0.12 
(0.54) 
0.09 
(0.78) 
 
Perspective 0.25 
(0.93) 
0.28 
(0.87) 
-0.08 
(0.77) 
-0.07 
(0.90) 
0.24 
(0.92) 
0.27 
(0.79) 
-0.13 
(0.78) 
 
Reliving 0.01 
(0.74) 
0.65 
(0.76) 
0.11 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(0.47) 
0.52 
(0.49) 
0.41 
(0.65) 
0.39 
(0.60) 
 
Time Travel 0.07 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(0.69) 
0.22 
(0.77) 
0.13 
(0.66) 
0.51 
(0.66) 
0.27 
(0.50) 
0.11 
(0.64) 
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Accuracy -0.15 
(0.68) 
0.13 
(0.74) 
0.03 
(0.73) 
-0.13 
(0.58) 
0.21 
(0.55) 
-0.07 
(0.54) 
-0.11 
(0.80) 
 
RT 3.97 
(1.46) 
3.81 
(1.57) 
3.80 
(1.23) 
4.12 
(1.66) 
3.80 
(1.43) 
3.52 
(1.18) 
3.40 
(1.00) 
 
Success 5.02 
(0.75) 
5.65 
(0.82) 
5.61 
(0.67) 
4.98 
(0.83) 
5.66 
(0.65) 
5.77 
(0.70) 
5.57 
(0.75) 
 
Self-rated regulatory success.  Participants‘ self-ratings of how successful they 
were in regulating or maintaining their emotions at the regulation session were generally 
high regardless of regulation condition (Ms > 4.98; see Table 1.2).  We submitted these 
self-ratings of success to a 2 (valence:  negative, positive) X 3 (instruction:  decrease, 
increase, maintain) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of instruction on 
self-ratings of success, F(2, 44) = 16.06, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .42.  Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that participants rated their success in decreasing their emotions as significantly 
lower than in increasing or maintaining their emotions, ps < .001; self-rated success on 
increase and maintain trials did not differ, p = .70.  There was no effect of event valence 
or valence X instruction interaction for success ratings, ps > .61, partial-ƞ2s < .02.   
Emotion Regulation Session: AMQ Ratings 
For each measured memory quality, we calculated differences between the 
regulation and baseline sessions on an event-by-event basis by subtracting the baseline 
session rating for a given event from the regulation session rating for that same event.  
The difference scores were then averaged for each question and submitted to 2 (valence:  
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negative, positive) X 3 (instruction:  decrease, increase, maintain) within-subjects 
ANOVAs.  The difference scores are summarized in Table 1.2.  
Emotion regulation session: Emotional qualities.  Difference scores for the 
emotional intensity ratings confirmed that participants attempted to change their 
emotional responses in accordance with the reappraisal instructions at the regulation 
session.  As hypothesized, there was a main effect of instruction for emotional intensity 
difference scores, F(2, 48) = 39.54, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .62.  Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed that the decrease instruction was associated with the greatest decrease in 
emotional intensity compared to the increase and maintain conditions, and the increase 
instruction was associated with the greatest increase in emotional intensity compared to 
the decrease and maintain conditions, all ps < .005.  There was also a main effect of event 
valence on emotional intensity change scores, such that negative events were associated 
with an overall greater decrease in intensity scores at the regulation session when 
compared to the positive events, p < .005.  However, there was no valence X instruction 
interaction, p = .25, partial-ƞ2  = .06.  
There was also a main effect of valence on negative emotion rating change scores, 
such that the greatest change scores occurred for negative AMs, F(1, 24) = 15.97, p < 
.001, partial-ƞ2   = .40.  This main effect of valence was qualified by a significant valence 
X instruction interaction for negative emotion ratings, F(2, 48) = 55.86, p < .001, partial-
ƞ2  = .70.  Post-hoc tests revealed that this interaction was driven primarily by negative 
emotion rating changes for events presented with the decrease instructions.  For negative 
AMs, there was a significantly greater decrease in negativity ratings for the decrease 
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condition compared to the increase and maintain conditions, ps < .001.  For positive 
AMs, there was a significantly greater increase in negativity ratings for the decrease 
condition compared to the increase and maintain conditions, ps < .001.   
A similar pattern of results occurred for positive emotion rating change scores.  
There was a main effect of valence, such that the greatest change scores occurred for 
positive AMs, F(1, 24) = 26.15, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .52.  As with the negative emotion 
change scores, this main effect of valence was qualified by a valence X instruction 
interaction, F(2, 48) = 66.88, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .74; once again, the interaction was 
driven by positive emotion rating changes for events presented with the decrease 
instruction.  For negative AMs, there were significantly greater increases in positivity 
ratings for the decrease and maintain conditions compared to the increase condition, ps < 
.01.  In contrast, for positive AMs, there was a significantly greater decrease in positivity 
ratings for the decrease condition compared to the increase and maintain conditions, ps < 
.001.   
Significant main effects of instruction were evident when examining changes in 
ratings of whether individuals felt the same emotions [F(2, 48) = 32.89, p < .001, partial-
ƞ2  = .58] and the same emotional intensity [F(2, 48) = 27.37, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .53] 
during recall as they did when events initially occurred.  In both cases, the main effect 
was driven by a significantly greater decrease in ratings for AMs in the decrease 
condition than the increase or maintain conditions, ps < .001.  Changes in ratings did not 
differ between the increase and maintain conditions, ps > .27.  In addition, there were no 
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main effects of valence or valence X instruction interactions for either scale, ps > .19, 
partial-ƞ2s < .07.  
Emotion regulation session:  Sensory qualities.  There was a significant main 
effect of instruction on changes in vividness ratings between the baseline and regulation 
sessions, F(2, 48) = 15.43, p < .001, partial-ƞ2  = .39.  AMs belonging to the increase 
trials were associated with significantly greater increases in vividness ratings than AMs 
from either the decrease or maintain trials, ps < .001 (see Fig. 1.1a).  In addition, AMs 
belonging to the decrease condition were associated with a significantly greater reduction 
than AMs from the maintain condition, p = .05.  There was no main effect of valence or 
valence X instruction interaction, ps > .82, partial-ƞ2s  < .01. 
There was a valence X instruction interaction for perspective ratings, F(2, 48) = 
3.61, p = .04, partial-ƞ2   = .13 (Fig. 1.1b).  Post-hoc tests revealed that negative AMs in 
the decrease condition increased more in field perspective than negative AMs in the 
maintain condition, p = .05; negative AMs in the increase condition increased in field 
perspective compared to those in the decrease condition, but only marginally so, p = .09.  
Positive AMs in the decrease condition increased slightly more in observer perspective 
than positive AMs in the increase or maintain conditions, but these effects were only 
marginally significant, ps < .14.  It is important to note that although there were shifts in 
reported perspective, these changes were slight and regardless of valence or instruction, 
AMs still tended to be recalled from a field perspective (T2 means ≥ 5.52). 
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Emotion regulation session: Recollective qualities.  There was a significant 
main effect of instruction on changes in reliving ratings, F(2, 48) = 17.29, p < .001, 
partial-ƞ2  = .42 (Fig. 1.2a).  Pairwise comparisons between the regulation instructions 
revealed that the increase condition was associated with greater increases in reliving 
ratings than the maintain and decrease conditions, ps < .001.  In addition, the decrease 
condition was associated with a significantly greater reduction in reliving ratings 
compared to the maintain condition, p = .04.  There was no effect of valence or valence X 
instruction interaction, ps > .12, partial-ƞ2s < .09. 
There was also a significant main effect of instruction for rating changes on the 
mental time travel [F(2, 48) = 7.48, p = .001, partial-ƞ2  = .24] and accuracy [F(2, 48) = 
6.07, p < .005, partial-ƞ2  = .20] scales (see Figs. 1.2b and 1.2c).  Both main effects were 
driven by significantly greater increases in ratings for AMs in the increase condition 
compared to AMs in both the decrease and maintain conditions, ps < .01.  Rating changes 
Figure 1.1.  Difference (Regulation Session – Baseline Session) scores 
for (a) subjective vividness ratings and (b) perspective ratings.    
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did not differ between the decrease and maintain conditions for either the mental time 
travel (p = .19) or accuracy (p = .25) scales.  In addition, there were no main effects of 
valence or valence X instruction interactions for either scale, ps > .59, partial-ƞ2s  < .02. 
 
 
 
Emotion regulation session:  Recall reaction time.  We also analyzed the effect 
of event valence and emotion regulation instruction on the amount of time it took 
participants to recall events in response to the personalized event titles at the regulation 
session1 (i.e., the amount of time between the presentation of an event cue and a button 
                                                          
1 Note that there are only RT data for the regulation session, when participants were asked to make a button 
press as soon as they had the cued event in mind.  There are no RT data for how long it took participants to 
Figure 1.2.  Difference (Regulation Session – Baseline Session) scores 
for (a) reliving ratings, (b) mental time travel ratings, and (c) belief in 
accuracy ratings.    
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press to indicate that a fully-formed memory was in mind).  A 2 (valence:  negative, 
positive) X 3 (instruction:  decrease, increase, maintain) within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of instruction, F(2, 40) = 5.49, p < .01, partial-ƞ2  = .22.  Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that this main effect was driven by significantly longer latencies to 
recall events presented with decrease than increase or maintain instructions, ps < .05; 
there was no latency difference for events in the increase and maintain conditions.  
Further, there was no main effect of valence or a valence X instruction interaction, ps > 
.26, partial-ƞ2s < .07.    
Discussion 
 
 The present experiment sought to determine whether attempts to cognitively 
reappraise the emotions associated with self-generated AMs influence the emotional and 
other subjective qualities associated with recall, as measured with a subset of scales from 
the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (e.g., Talarico et al., 2004).  Our results 
revealed that compared to baseline ratings made about the events, reappraisal modulated 
subjective experiences at recall.   
 The changes observed in emotion ratings between the baseline and reappraisal 
sessions confirmed that participants could modulate the emotional experience associated 
with the events.  In particular, individuals reported decreased or increased emotional 
intensity when instructed to down- or up-regulate their emotional responses, respectively, 
compared to being instructed to maintain emotional responses.  Being instructed to 
regulate also influenced valence ratings made about the events, particularly when 
                                                                                                                                                                             
generate the events at the baseline session because participants had to type an event title and sentence 
before making a behavioral response. 
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instructed to decrease emotions.  Hedonic regulation instructions were associated with 
increases in positivity ratings and decreases in negativity ratings, whereas non-hedonic 
regulation instructions were associated with decreases in positivity ratings and increases 
in negativity ratings.  Interestingly, participants reported that their current emotions and 
emotional intensity were least like the emotions and intensity experienced at the time of 
an events‘ encoding when instructed to down-regulate their response.  This finding may 
reflect individuals‘ sense that the emotions and intensity associated with events persists 
over time (Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009), such that only maintaining or increasing 
emotions in the present leads to a subjectively better match between past and present 
emotional experience. 
 The influence of regulation instruction on changes in subjective sensory detail 
ratings (decreased vividness ratings on down-regulation trials and increased vividness 
ratings on up-regulation trials) was in line with our hypothesis that attempts to change the 
emotional intensity associated with autobiographical events would modulate the sensory 
qualities of recall.  This finding is consistent with prior research demonstrating that 
higher emotional intensity is predictive of greater vividness (Talarico et al., 2004).  One 
possibility is that increasing or decreasing the amount of sensory detail recalled is a 
strategy unto itself for emotion regulation; indeed, focusing on or distancing oneself as a 
central figure in an emotional scene has been implicated as an emotion regulation 
strategy in response to emotional images (Davis, Gross, & Ochsner, 2011; Ochsner et al., 
2004), consistent with evidence that vivid imagery is a robust elicitor of emotional 
intensity (Holmes & Mathews, 2010).     
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 The significant valence X instruction interaction revealed for changes in 
perspective ratings was only partially consistent with our expectations and prior research.  
For example, the act of increasing emotions linked with both negative and positive events 
was associated with more of a field perspective, in line with findings that this perspective 
is linked to greater emotional intensity (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and that being 
instructed to focus on an event‘s emotionality leads individuals to adopt a field 
perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  Also consistent with prior work was the finding 
that instructions to decrease the emotions associated with positive events led to a shift 
toward more of an observer perspective, suggesting that creating physical distance from 
the imagery of the event was linked to emotional distance (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2010).   
However, some of the patterns in perspective change scores were inconsistent 
with our expectations.  First, being instructed to maintain the emotions associated with 
positive events led to as much of an increase in field perspective ratings as being 
instructed to increase emotions about positive events.  It is possible that the maintain 
positive instructions encouraged participants to focus on emotional aspects of the event 
from a field perspective in an effort to sustain their positive emotions.  Second, being 
instructed to down-regulate negative events was associated with an increase in field 
perspective, in contrast to prior research demonstrating that adopting an observer 
perspective during negative AM recall dampens emotional intensity (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006).  This inconsistency with prior research may be due to differences in the types of 
events queried; whereas other research on perspective has asked participants to recall 
traumatic events or the most negative events they had experienced, we asked participants 
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to generate 30 negative events.  It is likely that these negative events were milder in 
emotional intensity than the events recalled in prior experiments; perhaps shifting toward 
an observer perspective was not necessary to dampen emotional intensity.      
 Finally, our measures of recollection were modulated by regulation instructions.  
Down-regulation was associated with decreased ratings of reliving, whereas up-
regulation was associated with increased ratings of reliving.  Changes in belief in 
accuracy and mental time travel ratings followed the same pattern, though only up-
regulation was associated with significant changes compared to the maintain conditions.  
These results are generally consistent with findings that higher emotional intensity is 
predictive of recollective experience (Talarico et al., 2004), and fit well with our finding 
that reappraisal instructions modulated vividness, given that increased vividness is 
associated with greater recollection (Rubin, Burt, & Fifield, 2003; Rubin, Schrauf & 
Greenberg, 2003).   
 Interestingly, there were very few effects of event valence in the present 
experiment.  At the baseline session, negative and positive events only differed from one 
another in negativity and positivity ratings (as would be expected) and in emotional 
intensity, with negative events being rated as somewhat more intense than positive 
events.  It is possible that negative events were rated as more intense because they were 
slightly more recent than positive events.  Participants‘ baseline ratings of the subjective 
qualities associated with the recall of negative, positive, and neutral events revealed that 
emotional events were rated as more intense and vivid, and with greater experiences of 
reliving, mental time travel, and beliefs in accuracy.  However, negative and positive 
32 
 
events did not differ from one another on these dimensions.  As we noted in the 
Introduction, evidence for valence effects on AM phenomenology is mixed, with some 
finding greater sensory and reliving ratings for positive events (e.g., Bohn & Berntsen, 
2007; D‘Argembeau et al., 2003; D‘Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004) and others 
finding no subjective differences between negative and positive events (e.g., Comblain et 
al., 2005).  The relative lack of valence differences in the present experiment may be due 
to the greater number of emotional events that our participants generated (60 in total 
compared to 1 public event in Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; 4 each in D‘Argembeau et al., 
2003 and D‘Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).  If participants had to rate only their 
most positive or most negative events, it is possible that we would have seen valence 
effects similar to these prior investigations.  In addition, participants in our study were 
not restricted to recalling events from any particular time frame and therefore their AMs 
may have been somewhat more remote than the memories examined in other studies that 
restricted recall to events in the past year (e.g., D‘Argembeau et al., 2003).  Comblain et 
al. (2005) note that valence effects might be diminished when older events are examined.   
 We also examined the length of time it took for participants to recall the 
memories referenced by their self-generated cues at the regulation session to determine 
whether being instructed to reappraise the emotions associated with the events would 
influence their reaction time.  Our results revealed that being instructed to down-regulate 
led to longer recall latencies than either the up-regulate or maintain instructions.  One 
possible explanation for this finding is that down-regulation during event recall is more 
effortful than emotional up-regulation or maintenance.  Further support for this 
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possibility may be found in participants‘ ratings of how successful they were in 
regulating or maintaining their emotions for each event:  Participants reported less 
success for the down-regulation trials than either the up-regulation or maintain trials, 
which did not differ from one another.  Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to this 
explanation, longer latencies to recall events in the down-regulation condition might 
reflect underlying timing differences in the strategies used to decrease or increase 
emotional intensity.  Emotional intensity is presumed to unfold and increase over time in 
response to an emotional situation (Sheppes & Gross, 2011); down-regulating a response 
via reappraisal, then, is likely most effective early on in the emotion generation process, 
before intensity increases (Sheppes & Gross, 2011).  If individuals try early on in event 
recall to down-regulate their emotions, this could lead to longer latencies in generating 
events.  In contrast, up-regulation might rely more on the way that individuals choose to 
elaborate on the details of an event, which occurs once an event is already in mind.     
Our study confirms that non-clinical participants can successfully perform a 
cognitive reappraisal task using emotional AMs; this task can be used to address a 
number of future directions.  One area that is ripe for future research is in the clinical 
domain:  Individuals with clinical diagnoses like depression (Joorman & Siemer, 2011) 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (Lanius et al., 2010) are known to have emotion 
regulation impairments, suggesting that they may have deficits in modulating the content 
or subjective experience of emotional autobiographical recall in accordance with 
regulatory goals.  Indeed, some work has revealed that depressed individuals tend to 
recall positive events from an observer perspective, perhaps reflecting sustained 
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emotional distance from positive memories (e.g., Kuyken & Moulds, 2009).  Pinpointing 
regulatory deficits like these may have important implications for some of the 
contributing causes of and possible treatment options for affective disorders.   
It also would be interesting to examine the link between recall and emotion 
regulation in populations across the lifespan.  Healthy aging has been associated with 
increased hedonic emotion regulation goals (e.g., Mather, 2006).  If older adults are 
highly focused on hedonic regulation goals, they may have particular difficulty with 
regulating their memories in a non-hedonic direction.  These questions are also of 
particular importance at the earlier end of the lifespan (e.g., for school-aged children and 
adolescents), as these populations are still developing in their ability to effectively use 
emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Steinberg, 2005; Goldsmith, Pollak, & Davidson, 
2008; Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010).  Finally, the task used in the present study 
could be modified for use with different emotion regulation strategies (e.g., suppression 
or detachment) or AMs with specific qualities, such as those from particular lifetime 
periods or those that concern more discrete emotions (e.g., anger vs. sadness).   
 In sum, this study is the first to adapt a commonly used cognitive reappraisal task 
for use with dynamic, real-life, personally-relevant events rather than static images or 
film clips.  Our results extend prior research (e.g., Holland et al., 2010) by demonstrating 
that emotional goals at the time of recall can influence not only the content but also the 
subjective experience associated with recall.  More broadly, the current study provides 
further evidence that the constructive nature of AM (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Schacter & Addis, 2007) leaves its recall malleable and subject to the influence of one‘s 
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current goals (Conway, 2005), and suggests that emotion regulation can be added to the 
list of self-relevant goals that guide constructive processes.     
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Appendix A 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire Rating Scales 
Emotional Qualities 
While remembering the event, the emotions are extremely positive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Hardly  Somewhat Entirely 
While remembering the event, the emotions are extremely negative. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Hardly  Somewhat Entirely 
The emotions that I feel are extremely intense. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Hardly  Somewhat Entirely 
While remembering the event, I feel the same particular emotions I felt at the time of the 
event. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely     Identically 
different     the same 
 
While remembering the event, I feel the emotions as strongly as I did then. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely     Identically 
different     the same 
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Sensory Qualities 
While remembering the event, I can see it in my mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Vaguely Distinctly As clearly as if it were happening now 
While remembering the event, I feel that I see it out of my own eyes rather than that of an 
outside observer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Outside     Own 
observer      eyes 
 
Recollective Qualities 
While remembering the event, I feel as though I am reliving it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Vaguely Distinctly As clearly as if it were happening now 
While remembering the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Vaguely Distinctly Completely 
I believe the event in my memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have 
not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Significant     No 
fabrication     fabrication 
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Chapter 2 
The Neural Correlates of the Cognitive Reappraisal of Negative Autobiographical 
Memories 
Introduction 
 External stimuli in our environments, such as a fight with a loved one or a nerve-
wracking work presentation, often elicit emotional reactions that we desire to regulate 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007), and indeed much of the extant emotion regulation literature 
focuses on attempts to change which emotions are experienced, or the intensity of 
emotions evoked, in response to external information like images or film clips (see 
Ochsner & Gross, 2008; 2005, for reviews).  However, internally-generated cognitions 
also can produce emotional reactions.  For example, recalling a past fight or nerve-
wracking presentation can re-invoke in the here and now the emotions that were present 
at the time of an event‘s occurrence (e.g., Brewer, Doughtie, & Lubin, 1980; 
Westermann, Kordelia, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996).  Just as with external information, we are 
not merely passive recipients of our internally-generated emotional experiences.  The 
present study sought to determine the neural correlates of emotion regulation in response 
to negative autobiographical memories (AMs).  Because cognitive reappraisal, or the 
reinterpretation of emotional information in such a way as to decrease or increase its 
emotional impact, is one of the most studied and most effective means for emotion 
regulation (Gross & John, 2003; reviewed by Gross & Thompson, 2007), we focused 
specifically on how this strategy influences AM.   
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Although the link between AM recall and emotion regulation is relatively 
understudied, there is both behavioral and neural evidence that the two processes are 
interrelated.  Individuals report recalling their AMs in such a way as to regulate their 
emotions (e.g., recalling a successful exam performance to quell anxiety about an 
upcoming exam; Bluck et al., 2005).  The reciprocal relation is also true:  Regulatory 
goals can influence which AMs are most likely to be recalled (Josephson, Singer, & 
Salovey, 1996; DeHart & Rusting, 2000).  In addition, when individuals are instructed to 
recall a particular event (e.g., high school graduation), regulatory goals can influence 
which details and appraisals are reported about those AMs (Holland, Tamir, & 
Kensinger, 2010).  The relation between AM and emotion regulation is perhaps most 
evident in the clinical literature, which illustrates that a failure to effectively regulate 
emotional responses regarding past negative events (e.g., by ruminating on rather than 
reappraising negative emotions) is associated with affective disorders like depression 
(reviewed by Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), borderline personality disorder (Beblo et al., 
2006), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Lanius et al., 2010).  Taken together, evidence 
for the relation between emotion regulation and AM is in line with Conway‘s (2005) 
assertion that the constructive nature of AM retrieval leaves it malleable and open to 
modulation by personally-relevant goals.     
As noted, in addition to their behavioral links, both AM recall and cognitive 
reappraisal in response to emotional images or film clips engage neural networks with 
substantial overlap.  There are commonalities in prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity, likely 
due to the similar cognitive demands of AM recall and cognitive reappraisal.  For 
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example, both tasks rely on dorsolateral PFC [associated with maintaining and 
manipulating emotional information in working memory during reappraisal (reviewed by 
Ochsner & Gross, 2008) and manipulating the products of retrieval in working memory 
during AM recall (reviewed by Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007)], ventrolateral PFC 
[associated with selecting appropriate reappraisals during regulation (Denny, Silvers, & 
Ochsner, in press) and controlled retrieval processes, including appropriate cue 
specifications, during the AM access period (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007)], and medial 
PFC [associated with self-referential processing during both regulation (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008) and recall (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007)].  Cognitive reappraisal is further 
associated with increased activity in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), a region 
associated with conflict monitoring (e.g., between competing affective responses; Denny 
et al., in press) and correlated with reappraisal success (Ochsner et al., 2002), as well as 
orbitofrontal PFC (OFC), thought to support the selection of situationally appropriate 
emotions (reviewed by Denny et al., in press).   
Both reappraisal and recall processes also engage regions associated with 
emotional processing, such as the amygdala and the insula.  Recalling emotional AMs 
also has been associated with amygdala and other medial temporal lobe (MTL) activity 
(Markowitsch et al., 2000; Svoboda et al., 2006; Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007), 
particularly during the initial search for and accessing of events, suggesting that the 
amygdala may guide the recall of emotionally salient events (Daselaar et al., 2008).  
Further, amygdala activity during AM recall has been linked to activity in the PFC and 
hippocampus (Greenberg et al., 2005), and the emotional intensity of events is positively 
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correlated with activity in the PFC and amygdala (Botzung et al., 2010), as well as the 
hippocampus (Addis et al., 2004).            
Much of the emotion regulation literature focuses on the control of emotion 
processing areas via ―cold‖ cognitive regions in the PFC (see Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 
2008, for review).  However, cognitive reappraisal also modulates posterior activity in 
regions associated with visuospatial processing and attention, such as the parietal lobe, 
visual cortex, cuneus, and precuneus (Ochsner et al., 2004; Urry et al., 2006; Phan et al., 
2005; Goldin et al., 2008).  Interestingly, activity in similar regions—particularly the 
visual cortex, precuneus, and posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex—are activated by 
the visual imagery that is a defining feature of AM (e.g., Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007), 
and this activity has been positively correlated with behavioral ratings of emotional 
intensity associated with AMs (Botzung et al., 2010).  Though their role in reappraisal is 
not often elaborated upon, one possibility is that decreasing or increasing mental imagery 
is a useful strategy for decreasing or increasing emotional intensity, respectively (see 
Ochsner et al., 2004, for similar discussion).     
  To date, only a handful of studies have addressed how regions belonging to the 
AM neural network might be modulated as emotion regulation is occurring during recall.  
Two studies have focused on a more automatic form of regulation that can occur during 
mood-incongruent recall, revealing in healthy adults that being instructed to recall a 
positive AM following a negative mood induction recruited OFC and ACC (Cooney et 
al., 2007), with a similar pattern evident in ACC and lateral PFC in healthy adolescents 
(Joormann et al., 2012).  Although these studies suggest that affect regulation can 
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influence neural activity during AM recall, they do not address the type of effortful and 
volitional regulation invoked by cognitive reappraisal tasks, particularly given that 
participants were not explicitly instructed to regulate their emotions. 
Two other studies have compared the more effortful cognitive reappraisal with 
rumination during the recall of negative AMs.  Ruminating on angry AMs led to 
enhanced connectivity between inferior frontal gyrus and amygdala (Fabiansson et al., 
2012), and focusing on sad AMs led to increased activity in anterior cingulate cortex and 
medial PFC (Kross et al., 2009).  In both studies, self-reported negative affect was lower 
for reappraisal than rumination conditions.  However, reappraisal did not lead to any 
greater connectivity during the recall of angry AMs (Fabiansson et al., 2012), and it only 
led to increased activity in a region of left PFC that also was activated during rumination 
on sad AMs (Kross et al., 2009).   
Taken together, the Kross et al. (2009) and Fabiansson et al. (2012) experiments 
suggest that regulatory strategies can modulate core regions of the AM network, but that 
rumination may do so to a greater extent than reappraisal (see Kross et al., 2009).  
However, the designs of these studies leave open a number of questions.  One limitation 
of this work from a memory research standpoint is that participants were asked to apply 
multiple regulatory strategies to a limited number of AMs (9 in Kross et al., 2009; 1 in 
Fabiansson et al., 2012) over the course of the scan. It is unclear what the long-term 
effects of regulating the emotion related to an AM might be. For example, it is possible 
that being asked to ruminate upon the negative emotions associated with a memory might 
influence the details that are later constructed about that event and/or the amount of 
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emotion experienced during recall. If this is indeed the case, then being asked to perform 
such a strategy first might fundamentally change the experience of later trying to 
reappraise the emotion associated with that same memory.  In addition, these studies 
directly contrasted different forms of emotion regulation and did not include a condition 
in which participants were asked to maintain the emotions associated with their AMs 
(analogous to a ―view‖ condition in emotion regulation studies that use images or film 
clips; e.g., Ochsner et al., 2002; 2004).       
A second open question is how the up-regulation of negative emotions might 
modulate AM recall.  Kross et al. (2009) and Fabiansson et al. (2012) focused on the 
down-regulation of negative emotions, but reappraisal can also be used to increase 
negative emotions when feeling negative is deemed functional (e.g., recalling negative 
AMs in preparation for playing an aggressive game; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008).  
Although PFC regions are recruited during both the down- and up-regulation of responses 
to negative images, the consequence of that activation varies, resulting in a decrease or 
increase, respectively, of amygdala activity (Ochsner et al., 2004).   
To address these first two questions, we modified a cognitive reappraisal task 
traditionally used with emotional images or film clips for use with AMs (see Chapter 1).  
We scanned participants as they decreased, increased, or maintained the emotions 
associated with negative AMs that had been reported at a pre-scan session.  Each memory 
cue appeared with only one regulatory instruction to prevent initial reappraisal attempts 
from influencing subsequent attempts.  We predicted that attempts to down- and up-
regulate (vs. maintain) negative emotions during AM recall would be associated with 
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cognitive control regions in PFC and dACC.  In addition, we hypothesized that 
decreasing negative emotions (vs. maintaining or increasing) would be associated with 
decreases in emotion processing regions, such as the amygdala, as well as decreases in 
regions important for visual imagery during recall (e.g., visual cortex, precuneus).  On the 
other hand, we hypothesized that increasing negative emotions (vs. maintaining or 
decreasing) would be associated with greater activity in these same regions, and 
potentially with modulation of regions in the AM retrieval network previously shown to 
be sensitive to the effects of emotional intensity (e.g., Daselaar et al., 2008; Botzung et 
al., 2010). More specifically, increasing negative emotion might be associated with 
increased activity in the hippocampus and medial PFC (reflecting increased self-
referential processing; Botzung et al., 2010).         
A third exploratory question that the present study addressed concerns the timing 
of reappraisal during AM recall.  The constructive nature of AM recall is relatively 
lengthy and can be subdivided into at least two phases, including the initial search for and 
retrieval of AM details as a memory is being accessed (referred to here as the ―memory 
onset‖ phase), followed by an elaboration phase during which time the searched-for 
memory is held in mind and its details expounded upon (e.g., Conway & Rubin, 1993; 
Conway et al., 2001; Conway et al., 2003; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Daselaar et 
al., 2008; Steinvorth, Corkin, & Halgren, 2006; Addis et al., 2009).  At this point, it is 
unclear during which phase of AM recall cognitive reappraisal might occur, and whether 
up-regulating and down-regulating emotional responses occur over the same time course.  
Kross et al. (2009) and Fabiansson et al. (2012) provided regulation instructions only 
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after the AMs had been recalled and were being held in mind; such designs might 
illustrate how regulation strategies influence the elaboration phase of AM, but leave open 
the question of how having regulatory goals in mind influences the AM retrieval network 
during the initial memory onset and later memory elaboration phases.  
In the present experiment we asked individuals to make a behavioral response 
when they had each AM in mind, thereby providing us with the means to distinguish the 
memory onset and elaboration phases (see similar designs in Holland, Addis, & 
Kensinger, 2011; Conway et al., 2001; Conway et al., 2003; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2007; Daselaar et al., 2008; Steinvorth, Corkin, & Halgren, 2006; Addis et al., 2009).  It 
is possible that down-regulation might modulate neural activity earlier on as AMs are 
initially being accessed, particularly given evidence that down-regulation is most 
effective early on in the unfolding of negative emotions (see review by Sheppes & Gross, 
2011).  On the other hand, up-regulation may influence neural activity during AM recall 
across both memory phases as negative emotions build in intensity over time (Sheppes & 
Gross, 2011).  Finally, in line with proposals (e.g., Conway, 2005) that AM retrieval can 
be guided by personally-relevant goals, the present experiment included an instruction 
phase prior to the memory onset and elaboration phases; during this time, participants 
were presented only with the reappraisal instructions (i.e., ―Decrease,‖ ―Increase,‖ or 
―Maintain‖) for the subsequent memory cue.  We analyzed activity during this instruction 
phase to explore whether there was any anticipatory activity in preparation for 
reappraising or maintaining the emotions associated with AMs (see Herwig et al., 2007, 
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for evidence of increased PFC and decreased amygdala activity during a down-regulation 
instruction phase prior to the presentation of negative images).   
Methods 
Participants  
Twenty-eight young adults (16 female, range = 18-28 years, M = 21.89 years, SD 
= 3.25 years) participated in this study.  Two participants were dropped from subsequent 
analyses for failing to make button box responses during the scan, 1 participant was 
excluded for failing to complete the pre-scan appointment, 1 participant was excluded for 
failing to complete the scan appointment, 1 participant was excluded for excessive 
motion, and 1 participant was excluded due to scanner malfunction.  The final sample 
included 22 participants (13 female; M = 22.27, SD = 3.56) who had no history of 
psychiatric, neurological, or learning disorders, nor any history or current use of 
psychiatric medication.  Informed consent was obtained from all participants in 
accordance with the Boston College Institutional Review Board. 
Pre-Scan Stimulus Collection Session 
Approximately 7-14 days before the scan session (M = 6.73 days, SD = 2.00 days, 
range = 4-13 days), participants completed a stimulus collection session.  Each 
participant generated 90 specific AMs (i.e., events that lasted no longer than a day and 
were unique to time and place).  Sixty of the AMs were required to be negative in 
valence, and the remaining 30 were neutral.  Participants were given extensive lists of 
cues to aid with event generation, but they were not limited to use of those cues.  
Participants were given a spreadsheet that included valence prompts (i.e., either 
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―Negative‖ or ―Neutral‖); the pattern of the prompts was to generate a neutral event 
following the generation of two negative events to minimize the propagation of a 
negative mood state that might influence participants‘ subsequent behavioral ratings 
regarding the events.  For each event, participants were instructed to create a title that 
was just a few words but specific enough that if they were to see that title in the scanner 
they would know which event it was referencing.  In addition to the title, participants 
wrote a brief sentence describing each event and rated the AMs on how emotionally 
intense [1 (not at all) – 7(very)], negative [1 (not at all) – 7 (very)], positive [1 (not at all) 
– 7 (very)], and vivid [1 (vague) – 7 (highly)] they were.  Finally, participants provided 
their approximate age in years at the time of each event‘s occurrence.  The AM portion of 
the study took approximately 1.5 to 2 hours.   
Scan Session 
AM stimuli.  Stimuli were created based on the AMs generated during the pre-
scan stimulus collection session.  For the negative AMs, whenever possible, events that 
were rated as either very low (i.e., a 1 or 2) or very high (i.e., a 6 or 7) on emotional 
intensity were excluded as potential stimuli for the scan session.  In addition, any 
negative or neutral events that were not specific episodes were excluded as possible 
stimuli.  Of the remaining AMs, 15 negative events were assigned to a ―Decrease,‖ an 
―Increase,‖ and a ―Maintain‖ emotion regulation condition (described below) and 15 
neutral events were assigned to a ―Maintain‖ condition.  The behavioral characteristics of 
the events assigned to each condition are presented in Table 2.1.  For each participant, the 
negative events assigned to each emotion regulation condition were matched on each of 
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the behavioral ratings that participants made (intensity, negativity, positivity, vividness, 
and age).  The neutral and negative events were matched on vividness and age.   
Table 2.1.  Behavioral characteristics of negative and neutral AMs from the pre-scan 
session that were assigned to the scan session reappraisal or maintain conditions.  
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 Pre-Scan Behavioral Ratings 
 Intensity Negative Positive Vividness Age 
Decrease Neg 4.72 (0.75) 5.55 (0.58) 1.27 (0.27) 5.35 (0.77) 4.56 (2.45) 
Increase Neg 4.64 (0.74) 5.54 (0.65) 1.28 (0.33) 5.29 (0.77) 4.52 (2.50) 
Maintain Neg 4.70 (0.74) 5.57 (0.64) 1.28 (0.27) 5.38 (0.80) 4.56 (2.52) 
Maintain Neutral 2.40 (1.05) 1.43 (0.26) 3.92 (1.38) 5.13 (0.85) 3.66 (2.76) 
                
Emotion regulation task.  Immediately before being scanned, participants 
received instructions for the emotion regulation task that they performed in the scanner.  
Participants were instructed that when they saw either ―Decrease‖ or ―Increase‖ prompts, 
they should attempt to re-interpret (i.e., cognitively reappraise) the subsequent event cue 
in such a way as to feel a weaker or stronger emotional reaction than normal to the 
memory, respectively.  Example cognitive reappraisal strategies were given for both 
decrease and increase instructions.  For instance, participants were instructed that if they 
had a negative event cue about a friend forgetting their birthday, they might decrease 
their emotional reaction to that memory by focusing on how they still had a great time 
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celebrating their birthday even though that friend forgot.  On the other hand, if they had 
to increase their emotional reaction to that event, they might focus on the feelings of 
sadness or disappointment they had when they realized that friend forgot.  For both the 
maintain negative and maintain neutral conditions, participants were instructed to recall 
the events without trying to alter their feelings toward them.  Participants practiced each 
possible instruction with two example events (not used during the scan).   
The 60 regulation trials (15 each of Decrease, Increase, Maintain Negative, and 
Maintain Neutral) were pseudo-randomized such that no instruction appeared more than 
twice in a row; the trials were divided among 4 functional scanning runs.  The overall 
design for the emotion regulation task is summarized in the left panel of Fig. 2.1.  Each 
trial began with a fixation cross that lasted an average of 3 sec (jittered between 1 and 7 
sec).  The fixation period was followed by an instruction phase, during which time a 
regulation prompt (Decrease, Increase, or Maintain) appeared on the screen for an 
average of 6 sec (jittered between 3 and 9 sec).  A memory title created during the pre-
scan session then appeared on the line below the instruction for 12 sec.  Participants were 
instructed to make a button press on a button box they were holding in their right hand 
when they felt they had the fully formed event memory in mind.  The time between the 
memory title appearing on the screen and this button box press will be referred to as the 
―memory onset‖ phase.  Following the button box press, participants were instructed to 
continue thinking about and elaborating on the details of the memory in accordance with 
the regulation instructions for that trial for the remainder of the 12 sec.  This period will 
be referred to as the ―memory elaboration‖ phase.  Finally, each trial ended with two 
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rating scales that asked participants to rate:  (a) Emotional Intensity [1 (low) – 7 (high)] 
and (b) Vividness [1 (low) – 7 (high)] using the button boxes they held in each hand.  
Each rating scale appeared for a maximum of 4 sec.   
Sentence control task.  Sixteen trials of a sentence control task adapted from 
Addis et al. (2009) were divided among the 4 functional scanning runs and randomly 
interspersed with the regulation trials.  The sentence control task included sets of 3 
concrete, highly imageable and familiar nouns (selected from the Clark and Paivio 
extended norms; Clark & Paivio, 2004).   
The overall design of the sentence control task trials mirrored that of the 
regulation task and is summarized in the right panel of Fig. 2.1.  Each trial began with a 
fixation cross in the center of the screen for an average of 3 sec (jittered between 1 and 7 
sec).  The sentence instruction phase, during which time the word ―Sentence‖ appeared 
on the screen for an average of 6 sec (jittered between 3 and 9 sec), followed.  A set of 
three nouns then appeared on the screen on the line underneath the ―Sentence‖ instruction 
for 12 sec.  Participants were instructed to put the items in physical-size order and place 
them in a sentence with the structure ―X is smaller than Y is smaller than Z.‖  Once 
participants had sub-vocalized the sentence, they made a button press that demarcated the 
end of the onset phase.  The sentence onset phase controls for the memory search and 
integration processes in the memory onset phase.  They were then instructed to think 
about and elaborate on the appearance and functions of the three objects for the 
remainder of the 12 sec trial; this period between the button press and the end of the trial 
will be referred to as the elaboration phase.  Because the sentence elaboration phase 
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involved visuospatial processing, it controls for the elaboration of visuospatial details 
during the AM task.  The sentence trials ended with two rating scales lasting a maximum 
of 4 sec each:  (a) Detail [1 (low) – 7 (high)], and (b) Vividness [1 (low) – 7 (high)].       
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. (Left) Example trial for an autobiographical memory task in which 
individuals decreased, increased, or maintained the emotional intensity 
associated with negative events or maintained the emotional intensity associated 
with neutral events.  Note that the trial types were pseudorandomized such that no 
instruction appeared more than twice in a row.  (Right) Example trial for a 
sentence baseline task in which participants generated a sentence with the format 
“X is smaller than Y is smaller than Z” for different groups of 3 concrete nouns 
and then elaborated upon the appearance and functions of the objects.  Sentence 
baseline trials were interspersed with the autobiographical memory task.  
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Post-scan task.  Following the scanning portion of the study, after an 
approximately 0.5 hour delay, participants were given a spreadsheet that included the 60 
event titles, 1-sentence descriptions, and ages of the AMs they recalled in the scanner.  
For each event, participants were asked to mark whether the event they recalled in the 
scanner was the same that they had reported during the pre-scan session by responding 
―Yes,‖ ―No,‖ or ―Not sure.‖  They were also asked to make several ratings about each 
event:  (a) how similar the details that they recalled in the scanner were to the details they 
recalled during the pre-scan session [1 (not at all) – 7 (entirely)], (b) how emotionally 
intense they felt about the event [1 (not at all) – 7 (very)], (c) how negative they felt 
about the event [1 (not at all) – 7 (very)], (d) how positive they felt about the event [1 
(not at all) – 7 (very)], and (e) how vivid their recall of the event was [1 (not at all) – 7 
(vivid)].  The AMs were presented in the spreadsheet in the same order that participants 
saw them while in the scanner, and the task was self-paced. 
Scanning parameters.  Images were acquired on a 3 Tesla Siemens Tim Trio 
MRI scanner using a 32-channel head coil.  Stimuli were presented using the MacStim 
presentation software.  All words, instructions, and rating scales used in the experiment 
appeared in white text (Arial 36-point font) on a black background.  Stimuli were 
projected onto a screen located at the back of the magnet bore, and participants viewed 
the stimuli using a mirror attached to the head coil. 
T1-weighted localizer images and a T1-weighted inversion recovery echo planar 
image required for auto-alignment were collected.  Anatomic data were collected with a 
multiplanar rapidly acquired gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (TR = 2200 ms; TE = 
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1.64 ms; flip angle = 7°; field of view = 256 X 256 mm; slice thickness = 1 mm, no gap; 
1 X 1 X 1 mm resolution).  Functional images were collected using a T2*-weighted echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following parameters:  TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 
ms, FOV = 216 mm, flip angle = 85°.  Forty-seven interleaved coronal-oblique slices 
aligned perpendicular to the long axis of the hippocampus were collected in a 3 mm3 
matrix (slice thickness = 3 mm).   
Preprocessing and data analysis were conducted in SPM8 (Wellcome Department 
of Cognitive Neurology, London).  Preprocessing steps were as follows:  (1) slice timing 
correction, (2) motion correction using a six parameter, rigid body transformation 
algorithm, (3) normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template 
(resampling at 3 mm isotropic voxels), and (4) spatial smoothing using a 3 mm full-width 
half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. 
Imaging data analysis.  For each individual, the following events were modeled 
and analyzed using the general linear model approach on a voxel-by-voxel basis:  (a) 
Decrease Instruction, (b) Increase Instruction, (c) Maintain Negative Instruction, (d) 
Maintain Neutral Instruction, (e) Sentence Instruction, (f) Decrease Onset, (g) Increase 
Onset, (h) Maintain Negative Onset, (i) Maintain Neutral Onset, (j) Sentence Onset, (k) 
Decrease Elaboration, (l) Increase Elaboration, (m) Maintain Negative Elaboration, (n) 
Maintain Neutral Elaboration, and (o) Sentence Elaboration.  Contrasts between the 
various trial types were computed as described below, and the resulting contrast images 
were entered into second-level, random-effects analyses that used a statistical threshold 
of p < .001, uncorrected, and a 5-voxel threshold extent.  Medial temporal lobe regions, 
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including the amygdala, for which we had a priori hypotheses about how reappraisal 
instructions would modulate their activity, used a statistical threshold of p < .005, in 
accordance with prior cognitive reappraisal investigations (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2004).   
Results 
Scan Behavioral Results  
The behavioral results from the scan session are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2.  Behavioral characteristics of negative and neutral AMs that participants were 
instructed to decrease, increase, or maintain during the scan session.  Standard 
deviations are presented in parentheses.   
 Scan Behavioral Ratings 
Trial Type RT (sec) Intensity Vividness 
Decrease Neg 3.63 (1.46) 3.69 (0.92) 4.75 (0.81) 
Increase Neg 3.44 (1.43) 5.19 (0.58) 5.34 (0.73) 
Maintain Neg 3.46 (1.47) 4.65 (0.79) 4.96 (0.75) 
Maintain Neutral 3.04 (1.13) 2.79 (1.09) 4.74 (0.77) 
 
Reaction time.  A within-subjects ANOVA examining the effect of emotion 
regulation instruction on RT to access an AM revealed a main effect of instruction, F(3, 
63) = 7.98, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .28.  Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that this 
main effect was driven by a significantly faster reaction time for the maintain neutral 
condition than any of the negative AM regulation conditions, ps < .01, as well as a trend 
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for AMs in the decrease condition to take significantly longer to recall than AMs in the 
increase condition, p < .10.  Because these RT differences would mean different lengths 
of the onset phase depending on condition, we included RT as a parametric regressor for 
the onset phase on a trial-by-trial basis in the first-level analysis for each participant. 
Emotional intensity.  A within-subjects ANOVA examining the effect of 
emotion regulation instruction on emotional intensity ratings also revealed a main effect 
of instruction, F(3, 63) = 56.80, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .73.  Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed that participants‘ intensity ratings were modulated in the directions expected 
by the regulation instructions (Fig. 2.2).  Neutral AMs were rated as lower in intensity 
than any of the negative AM conditions, ps < .001.  Additionally, negative AMs in the 
increase condition were rated as significantly more intense than those in either the 
decrease or maintain conditions, whereas negative AMs in the decrease condition were 
rated as significantly less intense than those in the increase and maintain conditions, all 
ps < .001.   
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Vividness.  Consistent with predictions, a within-subjects ANOVA examining the 
effect of emotion regulation instruction on vividness ratings revealed a main effect of 
instruction, F(3, 63) = 7.61, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .27.  Pairwise comparisons confirmed 
that negative events in the increase condition were rated as more vivid than negative or 
neutral memories in any of the other conditions (ps < .006); negative events in the 
maintain condition were rated as significantly more vivid than those in the decrease 
condition (p = .003) and trended toward being more vivid than neutral events (p < .10).  
The vividness of negative memories in the decrease condition was equivalent to that of 
neutral memories (p = .97).      
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Figure 2.2. Average emotional intensity ratings (on a 1-7 scale) for 
negative and neutral AMs before the scan (i.e., when no regulation 
instructions were given), during the scan (when regulation instructions 
were given), and approximately 0.5 hours after the scan (in the absence 
of any regulation instructions).  
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Post-Scan Behavioral Results 
Table 2.3.  Post-scan mean behavioral characteristics of negative and neutral AMs from 
that had appeared with decrease, increase, or maintain instructions during the scan.  
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 Post-Scan Behavioral Ratings 
Trial Type Similarity Intensity Negative Positive Vividness 
Decrease Neg 6.02 (0.85) 4.38 (0.73) 4.79 (0.81) 1.79 (0.88) 5.12 (0.77) 
Increase Neg 6.10 (0.59) 4.65 (0.76) 5.28 (0.75) 1.55 (0.75) 5.17 (0.67) 
Maintain Neg 6.03 (0.71) 4.53 (0.75) 5.10 (0.62) 1.54 (0.54) 5.20 (0.66) 
Maintain Neutral 6.01 (0.70) 2.51 (0.84) 1.34 (0.23) 3.95 (1.39) 4.88 (0.75) 
 
Similarity of details.  A within-subjects ANOVA did not reveal any effect of 
instruction on how similar participants felt their AM recall in the scanner was to their 
recall during the pre-scan session, F(3, 60) = 0.30, p = .83, partial-ƞ2 = .02 (Table 2.3). 
Emotion variables.  A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
instruction on post-scan emotional intensity ratings, F(3, 60) = 60.95, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 
= .75 (Table 2.3).  As would be expected, pairwise comparisons confirmed that neutral 
AMs continued to be rated as lower in intensity than all of the negative AM regulation 
conditions, ps < .001.  In addition, pairwise comparisons revealed that negative AMs that 
had been in the decrease condition during the scan continued to be rated as lower in 
emotional intensity than those in the increase condition, p = .003.    
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There was also a significant main effect of instruction on post-scan negative 
emotion ratings, F(3, 60) = 333.31, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .94 (Table 2.3).  As with 
intensity ratings, pairwise comparisons confirmed that neutral memories were rated as 
significantly less negative than negative AMs from each of the regulation conditions, ps < 
.001.  More interestingly, participants rated the negativity of their negative AMs in line 
with what would be predicted based on instruction condition:  Negative AMs that had 
been in the decrease condition during the scan were rated as less negative than negative 
AMs from both the increase and maintain conditions, ps < .009, and negative AMs that 
had been in the increase condition during the scan were rated as more negative than AMs 
from both the decrease and maintain conditions, ps ≤ .05.   
  A similar pattern was also present for positive emotion ratings, including an 
overall main effect of instruction, F(3, 63) = 77.39, p < .001, partial-ƞ2 = .80 (Table 2.3).  
Pairwise comparisons confirmed that neutral memories were rated higher in positive 
emotion than negative AMs from any regulation condition, ps < .001.  Negative AMs that 
had appeared in the decrease condition during the scan were rated as higher in positive 
emotion than those negative AMs from both the increase and maintain conditions, ps < 
.04, though AMs from the increase and maintain conditions did not differ from one 
another in positive ratings, p = .91. 
Finally, there was a main effect of instruction for the post-scan vividness ratings, 
F(3, 60) = 4.54, p = .01, partial-ƞ2 = .19 (Table 2.3).  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
this main effect was driven by neutral memories being rated as less vivid than negative 
AMs from the increase and maintain conditions, ps < .02; there was also a trend for 
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negative AMs from the decrease condition to be rated as less vivid than the neutral AMs, 
p = .10.      
Imaging Results 
We first examined the neural activity during the negative and neutral maintain 
conditions and baseline sentence task to establish that regions previously associated with 
AM recall were present in our task (see Fig. 2.3). 
Elaboration Phase
Onset Phase
Instruction Phase
Maintain Negative > Maintain Neutral
Maintain Neutral > Sentence
X = 0
X = 10
X = -2
 
 
 
Autobiographical Memory Recall:  Instruction Phase 
Maintain vs. Sentence. To examine which regions of the brain were more active 
as individuals were preparing to maintain a response to AMs compared to preparing to 
Figure 2.3. Neural activity for the maintain neutral > sentence and 
maintain negative > maintain neutral contrasts during the instruction, 
onset, and elaboration phases.  Right-most column shows saggital 
cutaways for each phase.  Activity is significant at p < .001 and a 5-voxel 
threshold extent.  
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generate a sentence as part of the baseline task, we compared the maintain instruction 
phases to the sentence instruction phase (see top panel of Fig. 2.3).  Because the maintain 
instruction appeared regardless of whether it would be followed by a negative or neutral 
memory cue, this contrast contrasted all of the maintain instruction conditions (i.e., 
maintain negative and maintain neutral) against the sentence instruction condition.  There 
were few differences that reached significance; one region of the middle occipital gyrus 
(BA 18) was more active during the instruction phase for maintaining the emotions 
associated with negative or neutral memories than for preparing to generate a sentence.   
Autobiographical Memory Recall:  Onset Phase 
Maintain Neutral vs. Sentence.  We first contrasted the onset phase of neutral 
AMs with the onset phase of the sentence control task to examine which regions were 
engaged as individuals were accessing their AMs (i.e., in the time between the 
appearance of the memory cue and the button press indicating that a fully formed 
memory was in mind; see middle panel of Fig. 2.3).  This contrast largely replicated 
previous neuroimaging studies of AM; activity was evident in several left-lateralized 
regions of dorsal (BA 44) and ventral lateral (BA 47) PFC previously associated with 
memory search and retrieval processes (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007), as well as left 
lateral temporal lobe regions (BAs 21/22) engaged by the recall of semantic information 
during AM (Svoboda et al., 2006).  In addition, left posterior cingulate (BA 30), bilateral 
occipital lobe (BA 18), and bilateral cuneus (BAs 17/18) activations revealed by this 
contrast support the notion that AM engages sensory (and particularly visual) processing 
regions associated with the vivid nature of real-life events (Svoboda et al., 2006). 
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Maintain Negative vs. Neutral.  We contrasted activity as individuals were 
accessing the negative vs. neutral AMs in the maintain condition (see middle panel of 
Fig. 2.3).  Replicating previous findings, negative AM onset recruited more right 
dorsolateral (BA 44) prefrontal cortex and bilateral frontal pole (BA 10) as well as right 
lateral temporal regions (BAs 37/19, 39, 41, and 42/22), consistent with prior evidence 
that emotional (vs. neutral) AM recall preferentially engages right-hemispheric processes 
(Svoboda et al., 2006).  Accessing negative AMs was also associated with greater activity 
in bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (BAs 32/10 and 6) and bilateral precuneus (BA 7), 
regions that appear to be sensitive to increased emotional intensity during AM recall 
(Botzung et al., 2010).   
Autobiographical Memory Recall:  Elaboration Phase 
Maintain Neutral vs. Sentence.  As with the onset phase, we first analyzed 
which regions were engaged to a greater extent as individuals elaborated upon the neutral 
AMs they had recalled versus objects in the sentences they had generated (see bottom 
panel of Fig. 2.3).  Our findings were again in line with previous AM imaging studies and 
revealed right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47) as well as left superior frontal gyrus 
(BA 8), left frontal pole and bilateral temporal cortex (BAs 21 and 22).  Elaborating on 
neutral AMs further engaged several bilateral regions of medial prefrontal cortex (BAs 8 
and 9), bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (BAs 32 and 24), and left insula (BA 13).  More 
posterior activity throughout the occipital and parietal lobes and including visuospatial 
processing regions [e.g., left posterior cingulate (BA 31/23), left fusiform gyrus (BA 
37/19), left precuneus (BA 31/7)] was also evident.   
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Maintain Negative vs. Maintain Neutral.  We also examined which regions 
were active as individuals elaborated upon negative (vs. neutral) events in the maintain 
conditions (see bottom panel of Fig. 2.3).  Unlike the onset phase, which recruited 
primarily right-lateralized activity during negative AM recall, elaborating upon negative 
AMs engaged mostly left-lateralized regions, including in dorsal (BAs 45/46) and ventral 
(BA 47) lateral PFC and lateral temporal lobe areas implicated in memory search and 
retrieval processes (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007).  Negative AM elaboration also engaged 
a large cluster of left medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6) and a number of visuospatial 
processing regions [e.g., bilateral cuneus (BAs 17, 18, and 31), left fusiform (BA 37) and 
right lingual (BA 18) gyri, bilateral inferior (BAs 18 and 19) and left middle (BAs 19 and 
37) occipital gyri], consistent with these regions‘ positive associations with an event‘s 
emotional intensity (Botzung et al., 2010).    
Emotion Regulation During Autobiographical Memory Recall 
We next analyzed the neural activity present as individuals down- and up-regulated (vs. 
maintained) the negative emotions associated with their AMs. 
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Negative Memory Retrieval:  Instruction Phase
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Reappraising vs. Maintaining Emotions.  We examined which brain regions 
were more active as individuals prepared to increase or decrease negative AMs versus to 
maintain negative AMs, or vice-versa.  The overall pattern revealed that being instructed 
to reappraise negative emotions engaged more regions than being instructed to maintain 
emotions, with the increase condition revealing the most extensive activity.  More 
Figure 2.4. (a) Neural activity for the decrease and maintain trials during the 
negative AM instruction phase.   (b) Neural activity for the increase and 
maintain trials during the negative AM instruction phase.  (c) Neural activity 
for the decrease and increase trials during the negative AM instruction 
phase.  Plotted activity is significant at p < .001 and a 5-voxel threshold 
extent.  
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specifically, during the decrease (vs. maintain) instruction condition, regions of left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47) and right anterior cingulate (BA 24) previously 
implicated in the reappraisal of negative images (Ochsner et al., 2004) were activated, as 
was right medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6), and bilateral temporal (BAs 22/21) and 
occipital (BAs 19/18) cortices (see Fig. 2.4a).  Similar right anterior cingulate (BA 
32/24), bilateral temporal (BAs 42/22/39/41) and right occipital (BAs 31/18/19) lobe 
activity was present in the increase (vs. maintain) instruction contrast, but this contrast 
also revealed more extensive activity in regions throughout the prefrontal cortex (see Fig. 
2.4b).  Areas of right dorsolateral PFC (BA 9), left medial PFC (BA 8) and bilateral 
frontal pole (BA 10) were all engaged more by the increase than maintain instruction.  
Few regions were more active during the maintain instruction phase; only a single cluster 
of left posterior cingulate (BA 31) and two clusters of left caudate nucleus were engaged 
to a greater extent in the maintain instruction than the decrease instruction phase, and 
only a region of left cerebellum was engaged to a greater extent than in the increase 
instruction phase.    
Decreasing vs. Increasing Emotions.  A direct contrast of the decrease and 
increase instruction phases confirmed that activity was more widespread during increase 
than decrease instructions (see Fig. 2.4c; Table 2.4). Most striking were a number of 
regions in the prefrontal cortex, including left ventrolateral (BA 47), dorsolateral (BA 9), 
and orbitofrontal (BA 11) areas; and right-lateralized frontal pole (BA 10).  Regions 
previously associated with emotion processing and regulation, such as right insula (BA 
13) and bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus (BAs 32/24, 23, and 25) were also engaged 
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more during the ―Increase‖ than ―Decrease‖ instructions, as were posterior areas 
important for visuospatial processing and representation [right cuneus (BA 31), left 
precuneus (BA 31/7), left posterior cingulate gyrus (BAs 31/24/23) and inferior parietal 
lobe (BA 40)].     
Table 2.4.  Group activations for the increase > decrease instruction contrast. 
 
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Increase > Decrease Instruction  
Frontal        
Inferior frontal gyrus 47 L -32 23 -15 4.68 8 
 47 L -26 27 -6 4.60 7 
 47 L -30 33 -8 4.20 9 
Middle frontal gyrus 10 R 34 60 -10 4.51 31 
Medial frontal gyrus 10 R 6 61 14 3.77 6 
Superior frontal gyrus 11 L -24 50 -11 4.35 13 
 8 L -12 46 31 3.95 5 
 9 R 18 52 32 4.20 9 
Parietal        
Inferior parietal lobe 40 L -28 -45 28 4.86 7 
Occipital        
Cuneus 31 R 26 -73 7 4.66 7 
Precuneus 31/7 L -20 -47 36 5.06 10 
Limbic        
Insula 13 R 32 20 16 4.17 8 
Cingulate gyrus 31 L -24 -33 40 5.93 13 
 24/23 L -20 -20 27 5.38 14 
 32/24 L -24 25 25 4.22 5 
 24/23 R 22 7 27 4.92 5 
 25 R 4 6 -5 4.51 6 
 32 R 8 35 -7 4.44 6 
Other        
Caudate  R 22 -7 22 4.68 7 
Claustrum  L -28 9 16 4.13 6 
  L -24 22 15 3.76 5 
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By contrast, when examining the decrease > increase contrast, no regions 
survived our statistical threshold of p < .001 and a 5-voxel cluster extent (but see Table 
2.5 for regions that arose at a reduced threshold of p < .005).    
Table 2.5.  Group activations for the decrease > increase instruction contrast.  Note that 
activity in reported regions was significant only at a more liberal threshold of p < .005 
and a 5-voxel cluster extent. 
 
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Decrease > Increase Instruction  
Regions reported are significant at p < .005, k ≥ 5 voxels 
Medial temporal         
Parahippocampal gyrus  L -16 -41 -3 3.84 7 
Hippocampus  L -28 -22 -11 2.95 5 
Other temporal        
Fusiform gyrus  L -30 -36 -12 3.84 5 
Limbic         
Cingulate gyrus  L -20 -54 14 3.26 6 
Occipital        
Middle occipital gyrus 37/19 R 38 -74 -8 3.31 6 
Other        
Cerebellum  R 16 -59 -7 3.70 6 
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Figure 2.5. (a) Neural activity for the decrease and maintain trials during negative AM 
onset.  Saggital slice shows a region of left hippocampus (Tal: x = -26, y = -35, z = 0) 
that was more active during the decrease than maintain trials.  (b) Neural activity for 
the increase and maintain trials during negative AM onset.  Saggital slice shows a 
region of right amygdala (Tal: x = 30, y = -3, z = -17) as well as two regions of right 
hippocampus (Tal: x = 28, y = -14, z = -14; Tal: x = 30, y = -29, z = -7) that were 
more active during the maintain than increase trials.  (c) Neural activity for the 
decrease and increase trials during negative AM onset.  Saggital slice shows a region 
of right amygdala (Tal:  x = 30, y = 1, z = -17) as well as two regions of right 
hippocampus (Tal: x = 26, y = -33, z = -8; Tal: x = 32, y = -16, z = -14) that were 
more active during the decrease than increase trials.  Activity is significant at p < .001 
and a 5-voxel threshold extent.  
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Reappraising vs. Maintaining Negative Emotions.  We next examined which 
regions were engaged to a greater extent as individuals were accessing negative 
memories whose intensity they had been instructed to decrease or increase versus to 
maintain.  The overall pattern of results during the onset phase was dissimilar to that of 
the instruction phase.  Whereas instructions to increase emotion had led to a greater 
extent of activation, during the onset phase, accessing memories in the decrease 
condition recruited the most widespread neural activity.   
There was a relative paucity of activity present when contrasting the increase 
versus maintain negative onset phases, with only a small cluster of basal ganglia 
surviving our statistical threshold (see Fig. 2.5b).  By contrast, when comparing activity 
in the decrease and maintain conditions (Fig. 2.5a), regions previously associated with 
both memory retrieval and emotion regulation [bilateral dorsal (BAs 44 and 46) and 
ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (BAs 11 and 47) and left frontal pole (BA 10)] were 
engaged more by the decrease condition, as were regions associated with retrieval 
[bilateral temporal cortices (BAs 21, 22, 38 and 39), left hippocampus, and bilateral 
posterior cingulate cortex (BAs 30 and 23)].  Contrary to expectations, emotion 
processing regions [left medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6) and left insula (BA 13)] and 
visuospatial [left cuneus (BAs 18 and 30), right precuneus (BA 31), right angular (BA 
39) and bilateral occipital (BAs 18 and 19) gyri], previously associated with enhanced 
emotional intensity during cognitive reappraisal (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2004) and AM 
(Botzung et al., 2010) tasks, were more active as individuals accessed negative events 
that they were instructed to down-regulate.   
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There was very little enhancement of activity when maintaining rather than 
decreasing negative AMs during the onset period (Fig. 2.5a).  Only a small cluster in the 
left frontal pole (BA 10) as well as two clusters in the left caudate nucleus were more 
active during the maintain negative than decrease onset conditions.  By contrast, and 
contrary to our expectations, there was extensive activity evident for the maintain 
negative > increase contrast during the onset phase (Fig. 2.5b), throughout bilateral 
prefrontal cortex [dorsal (BAs 9 and 46), ventral (BA 47), and orbitofrontal (BA 11) 
regions], bilateral posterior cingulate gyrus (BAs 23, 30 and 31), and right-lateralized 
medial [hippocampus, parahippocampal and fusiform gyri, amygdala] and bilateral 
temporal lobes (BAs 21, 22, 38 and 39).  In addition to greater amygdala activity,  the 
maintain negative condition also engaged other bilateral emotion processing regions, 
including insula (BA 13), and medial prefrontal cortex (BAs 6 and 10) to a greater extent 
than the increase negative condition during the memory onset phase.  Finally, a number 
of posterior regions were also revealed in this contrast, including sensory processing 
regions in both the occipital [bilateral precuneus (BAs 7, 19 and 31), left lingual gyrus 
(BA 19), bilateral occipital gyri (BAs 18 and 19)] and inferior (left BA 40) and superior 
parietal (bilateral BA 7) lobes.   
Decreasing vs. Increasing Negative Emotions.  A direct contrast of the decrease 
and increase conditions during the onset phase confirmed that the decrease condition 
engaged more activity (Table 2.6; Fig. 2.5c); there was extensive whole-brain activity 
that included reappraisal and retrieval-related regions throughout the prefrontal cortex 
[right dorsal (BAs 6, 9, and 46) and bilateral ventral lateral (BAs 11/47) prefrontal cortex 
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and left frontal pole (BA 10)] and retrieval-related regions in bilateral posterior cingulate 
gyrus (BAs 24 and 31), primarily right-lateralized medial [hippocampus, fusiform and 
parahippocampal gyri] and bilateral temporal (BAs 21, 22 and 39) lobes.   Contrary to 
our hypotheses (but in line with the above-reported results contrasting the reappraisal and 
maintain negative onset conditions), the decrease condition also was associated with 
greater activity in primarily left-lateralized emotional processing regions [medial 
prefrontal cortex (BAs 6, 9 and 11) and amygdala] during the onset phase.  Accessing 
memories in the decrease (vs. increase) condition was further associated with increased 
activity in visual processing regions [right precuneus (BAs 7 and 31), bilateral cuneus 
(BAs 18 and 23), and bilateral occipital gyri (BAs 18 and 19)].  On the other hand, 
activity revealed by the increase > decrease contrast was limited to relatively small 
clusters in left insula (BA 13), and right anterior (BA 24) and left posterior (BA 23) 
cingulate gyrus (Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.6.  Group activations for the decrease > increase onset contrast.   
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Decrease > Increase Onset  
Frontal        
Inferior frontal gyrus 47 R 42 34 -12 6.34 535 
 13 R 32 11 -11 5.08 6 
 46 R 50 26 15 4.97 92 
 45 R 51 27 4 4.88 9 
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L -2 16 47 6.41 623 
 6 L -6 46 34 4.61 22 
 9 L -8 42 18 4.47 19 
 11 L -6 52 -13 5.47 106 
 10 R 6 53 10 4.03 6 
Middle frontal gyrus 6/9 L -46 0 39 4.21 6 
Superior frontal gyrus 10 L -8 61 19 5.68 118 
 9 R 4 52 29 4.92 25 
Precentral gyrus 44 L -46 10 7 7.91 1698 
Medial temporal        
Hippocampus  R 32 -16 -14 6.62 30 
  R 26 -33 -8 6.09 46 
Parahippocampal gyrus  L -22 -37 -7 9.92 3448 
 30/19 R 22 -39 -3 4.68 10 
 30 R 18 -45 1 3.97 7 
Other temporal        
Superior temporal gyrus 22 L -48 -25 0 9.23 1307 
Middle temporal gyrus 39 L -50 -67 27 4.96 94 
 21 R 55 -6 -13 6.16 314 
 21 R 65 -41 0 4.71 20 
 22 R 46 -35 4 4.67 56 
 21/22 R 61 -48 10 4.41 21 
Fusiform gyrus 37 R 42 -51 -8 4.10 5 
Parietal        
Superior parietal lobe 7 R 28 -61 53 3.92 6 
Precuneus 7 R 28 -52 49 3.76 6 
 31 R 14 -65 20 4.15 11 
 31 R 10 -71 22 3.74 6 
Occipital        
Inferior occipital gyrus 18 R 36 -80 -6 7.40 1311 
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Middle occipital gyrus 19 L -26 -73 20 4.16 5 
Superior occipital gyrus 19 L -32 -70 31 5.61 23 
 19 R 32 -68 29 4.80 96 
Cuneus 23 L -6 -71 13 4.64 63 
 18 L -12 -83 13 3.80 5 
 18 R 10 -73 17 3.89 11 
Limbic        
Amygdala  L -30 -4 -14 6.18 2 
  L -28 2 -20 4.70 4 
  L -18 -6 -16 4.26 3 
  R 30 2 -20 5.16 7 
  R 30 1 -17 5.16 7 
Cingulate gyrus 31 L -2 -29 38 7.00 92 
 24 L -4 -4 28 3.97 5 
 24 R 2 3 27 6.71 71 
 31 R 8 -35 29 4.77 36 
Other        
Basal ganglia  L -6 0 -2 5.13 7 
  L -18 -6 -6 5.10 17 
Cerebellum  L -4 -60 -36 4.69 6 
  L -26 -68 -39 4.80 5 
  L -28 -56 -22 4.93 9 
  R 4 -54 -26 7.60 23 
  R 6 -72 -10 4.91 12 
Hypothalamus  -- 0 -10 -10 4.17 6 
 
Table 2.7.  Group activations for the increase > decrease onset contrast.   
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Increase > Decrease Onset  
Limbic        
Insula 13 L -28 -6 26 4.24 13 
Cingulate gyrus 23 L -10 -36 17 6.36 5 
 24 R 24 15 27 4.25 8 
Parietal        
Postcentral gyrus 3/2/1 R 57 -24 34 4.24 8 
Other        
Basal ganglia  L -22 18 16 6.83 104 
Caudate nucleus  L -18 -11 23 5.39 18 
  R 20 14 16 4.59 8 
  R 16 -7 19 4.48 11 
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Cerebellum  L -32 -68 -30 4.78 38 
Thalamus  L -6 -3 15 3.96 8 
  R 14 -3 13 3.93 10 
Regulation During Recall: Elaboration Phase
Increase > Decrease
Decrease > Increase
Maintain > Increase
Increase > Maintain 
Maintain > Decrease
Decrease > Maintain
Negative Memory Retrieval:  Elaboration Phase
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Reappraising vs. Maintaining Negative Emotions.  Contrasts comparing the 
reappraisal conditions to the maintain conditions as individuals elaborated upon the 
Figure 2.6. (a) Neural activity for the decrease and maintain trials during negative 
AM elaboration.  Saggital slice shows a region of left dorsomedial PFC (Tal: x = -2, 
y =8, z = 49) that was more active during the maintain than decrease trials.  (b) 
Neural activity for the increase and maintain trials during negative AM elaboration.  
Saggital slice shows two regions of right hippocampus (Tal: x = 30, y = -14, z = -16; 
Tal: x = 30, y = -37, z = 0) that were more active during the increase than maintain 
trials.  (c) Neural activity for the decrease and increase trials during negative AM 
elaboration.  Saggital slice shows a region of left amygdala (Tal:  x = -28, y = -6, z 
= -13) that was more active during the decrease than increase trials.  Activity is 
significant at p < .001 and a 5-voxel threshold extent.  
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details of their negative AMs revealed a pattern opposite to that observed during the 
memory onset phase.  During the elaboration phase (see Fig. 2.6a), decreasing negative 
emotions associated with AMs engaged only two regions in the prefrontal cortex [left 
middle (BA 8) and right superior (BA 9) frontal gyri], one in right middle temporal gyrus 
(BA 21), and one in left angular gyrus (BA 39), compared to maintaining the negative 
emotions associated with AMs.  However, the reverse contrast (maintain negative vs. 
decrease negative) revealed extensive neural activity, including regions previously 
associated with memory retrieval [left-lateralized dorsolateral (BA 44) PFC, bilateral 
middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), and left inferior prefrontal (BA 46) and temporal (BA 37) 
cortices], emotion processing [left medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6)], and the processing 
and representation of visual information [bilateral middle occipital gyrus (BAs 18 and 
31), right cuneus (BA 31), bilateral inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), and left fusiform gyrus 
(BA 37)].   
The contrast comparing neural activity as individuals elaborated upon negative 
AMs in the increase (vs. maintain) conditions revealed a similar pattern of activity to the 
maintain negative (vs. decrease) contrast (see Fig. 2.6b).  There was widespread activity 
in regions known to support both memory retrieval and cognitive reappraisal [primarily 
left-lateralized dorsal (BA 44/45) and ventral (BAs 11 and 47) lateral prefrontal cortex 
and left frontal pole (BA 10)], as well as regions more specific to memory retrieval [right 
hippocampus and bilateral superior (BAs 38 and 39) and middle (BAs 21 and 22) 
temporal gyri].  In addition, as hypothesized, increasing (vs. maintaining) the negative 
emotions associated with AMs engaged regions associated with emotional processing 
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[left medial prefrontal cortex (BAs 6, 8, and 9) and left insula (BA 13)] and visual 
processing [left precuneus (BAs 7 and 19), left lingual (BA 18) and bilateral occipital 
(BAs 19 and 39) gyri, and posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 24)].  In contrast to this 
widespread activity, maintaining (vs. increasing) negative emotions during the 
elaboration phase engaged fewer regions, primarily in the left medial (BA 6) and bilateral 
middle frontal gyrus (BAs 6, 10, and 11), right inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), and 
bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus (BAs 24 and 32). 
Decreasing vs. Increasing Negative Emotions.  Directly comparing the decrease 
> increase conditions as individuals elaborated on the details of their negative AMs (see 
Fig. 2.6c) revealed that few regions were more engaged during decrease than increase 
trials; these regions included small clusters of bilateral superior frontal gyrus (BAs 9 and 
10) and right superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) (see Table 2.8).   
Table 2.8.  Group activations for the decrease > increase elaboration contrast. 
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Decrease > Increase Elaboration  
Frontal        
Superior frontal gyrus 10 L -32 58 -6 4.48 6 
 9 R 20 50 25 3.73 6 
Temporal        
Superior temporal gyrus 22 R 65 -25 5 4.48 6 
Other        
Caudate  R 16 1 20 5.04 20 
 
The reverse contrast, however, revealed a widespread set of regions that were 
more active as individuals elaborated on their negative AMs that had appeared with 
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increase (vs. decrease) regulation instructions (see Fig. 2.6c; Table 2.9).  These regions 
included primarily left-lateralized dorsal (BAs 44 and 45) and ventrolateral (BAs 11 and 
47) PFC.  In addition, several regions of the medial temporal lobes [right hippocampus, 
left parahippocampal (BA 34), left fusiform gyri, left amygdala], lateral temporal cortices 
[bilateral middle (BAs 21, 39/19) and left superior (BA 22 and 38) temporal gyri] and 
posterior cingulate (BA 31 and 30/23) were engaged more by the increase than decrease 
trials during the elaboration phase.  The same was true of visual processing regions 
[bilateral precuneus (BA 31), left cuneus (BA 18), and bilateral middle occipital gyrus 
(BA 19)].   
Table 2.9.  Group activations for the increase > decrease elaboration contrast.  
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Increase > Decrease Elaboration  
Frontal        
Inferior frontal gyrus 45/44 L -38 11 22 6.78 148 
 45 L -53 22 14 3.87 6 
 47 L -34 30 -12 4.83 12 
 47 L -42 27 -3 4.29 22 
 47 L -38 21 -13 3.90 5 
 47 R 28 13 -17 4.54 6 
 47 R 36 31 -2 3.95 8 
Medial frontal gyrus 6/32 L -4 10 47 6.27 256 
 11 L -10 48 -12 4.55 16 
Middle frontal gyrus 6 L -44 6 44 4.42 20 
Superior frontal gyrus 8 L -6 20 52 4.45 14 
Medial temporal        
Hippocampus  R 26 -12 -15 4.93 20 
  R 28 -33 0 4.32 6 
Parahippocampal gyrus 34 L -16 -10 -15 4.70 15 
Other temporal        
Middle temporal gyrus  L -53 -31 2 4.84 28 
 21 L -50 -10 -10 4.34 23 
 21 L -53 -20 -2 4.03 8 
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 21 R 53 1 -17 4.41 5 
 39/19 R 32 -67 20 4.33 6 
Superior temporal gyrus 22 L -50 -46 13 6.24 266 
 38 L -50 -2 -10 4.23 6 
Fusiform gyrus  L -46 -37 -12 7.25 682 
Parietal        
Precuneus 31 L -10 -45 35 4.54 12 
 31 R 2 -65 27 4.65 15 
Occipital        
Middle occipital gyrus 19 L -32 -91 6 6.16 381 
 19 R 38 -72 -6 6.28 671 
Cuneus 18 L -8 -79 17 3.99 9 
Limbic        
Amygdala  L -28 -6 -13 5.00 19 
Cingulate gyrus 31 L -2 -67 13 4.39 14 
 31 L -4 -37 35 4.53 27 
 30/23 L -14 -54 8 8.66 810 
Other        
Cerebellum  R 2 -54 -28 5.60 13 
  R 2 -18 25 3.91 9 
Thalamus  L -2 -15 4 4.63 20 
 
Discussion 
 We used a novel cognitive reappraisal paradigm adapted from the emotion 
regulation literature for use with AMs and asked participants to decrease, increase, or 
maintain the emotions associated with negative events from their personal pasts while 
undergoing an fMRI scan.  Emotional intensity ratings about the events made during the 
scan confirmed that participants were reappraising in the instructed direction, as AMs 
that had appeared with the increase instruction were rated as the most intense, followed 
by AMs that had appeared with the maintain instruction, and then by AMs that had 
appeared with the decrease instruction.  By scanning individuals as they prepared to 
reappraise or maintain their emotions, accessed events associated with personal cues, and 
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then elaborated upon the AMs they had recalled, the present experiment revealed that a 
different timecourse of activation was associated with the down- versus the up-regulation 
of AMs. 
Down-Regulation of Negative Emotions 
  The down-regulation of negative emotions during AM recall recruited the 
greatest neural activity during the memory onset phase (i.e., the time between the 
presentation of a memory cue and a button press indicating that the fully formed memory 
was in mind).  As would be expected based on previous reappraisal studies with 
emotional images (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008), decreasing emotional responses was 
associated with increased activity in cognitive control regions throughout the PFC when 
compared to maintaining emotional responses.  Areas of activation were revealed in 
dorsolateral PFC regions associated with maintaining and manipulating information in 
working memory (e.g., Curtis & D‘Esposito, 2003); ventrolateral PFC regions associated 
with autobiographical memory retrieval (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007) and the selection 
of context-appropriate reappraisals (reviewed by Denny et al., in press; see also Badre, 
Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005); and medial PFC regions associated 
with self-referential processing (Kelly et al., 2002), with the flexible assignment of 
affective value (D‘Argembeau, Xue, Lu, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2008), and with the 
extinction of conditioned emotional responses (particularly ventromedial PFC; Phelps, 
Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004; Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008). 
 Although this PFC activity follows in line with other cognitive reappraisal tasks 
(reviewed by Ochsner & Gross, 2008; 2005) that have used a maintenance condition as a 
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baseline, the extensive PFC activity during the memory onset phase when using the 
increase condition as a baseline was contrary to our hypotheses.  A prior study that 
compared down- and up-regulation during the presentation of negative images (Ochsner 
et al., 2004) found that both types of reappraisal recruited PFC activity, presumably 
because both strategies rely on cognitive control.  Perhaps even more surprising were 
extensive activations in the MTL (e.g., hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus) and 
emotion processing regions during down-regulation as AMs were being accessed, 
including the insula when using the maintain condition as a baseline, and both the insula 
and amygdala when using the increase condition as a baseline.  Activity in these emotion 
processing regions typically declines as a result of PFC control during down-regulation 
(Ochsner et al., 2002; Banks et al., 2007) and, along with MTL activity, has previously 
been positively correlated with the emotional intensity of AMs (Addis et al., 2004; 
Botzung et al., 2010).  Similarly, and again contrary to our expectations, down-regulation 
engaged several posterior regions associated with the processing and maintenance of 
visual imagery (e.g., cuneus, precuneus, occipital and parietal lobes), irrespective of 
whether it was being compared to the maintain or up-regulation conditions.  These 
regions are associated with increased self-reports of AM vividness (Daselaar et al., 2008) 
and are positively correlated with AM emotional intensity (Botzung et al., 2010); their 
activation is particularly surprising given that AMs in the decrease condition were rated 
as less intense and vivid than those in the increase condition. 
 One possible explanation for this pattern of findings for the down-regulation of 
negative emotions during AM recall may be gleaned from the process model of emotion 
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regulation, which posits that the reappraisal of negative emotions may be especially 
sensitive to timing effects (Sheppes & Gross, 2011).  The model presumes that emotions 
unfold over time and that down-regulating negative emotions is most effective at early 
time points before intensity increases.  For instance, being instructed to down-regulate 
emotions about a sad film early during the film is an effective way to reduce negative 
affect, but reappraisal instructions given later during the film are ineffective, presumably 
as emotional intensity has passed a point of ―no return‖ (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). 
 The timing hypothesis put forth by the process model (Sheppes & Gross, 2011) 
may apply to down-regulation that occurs during AM recall; just as decreasing negative 
emotion is most effective at early time points during a film clip, it may also be most 
effective at early time points during recall (i.e., as a memory is initially being accessed).  
Although speculative at this point, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
down-regulation occurred during the memory onset phase.  Based on reaction time to 
make a button press indicating they had AMs in mind, negative AMs in the decrease 
condition took marginally significantly longer to recall than negative AMs in the increase 
condition, perhaps suggesting that additional cognitive processing or recall was occurring 
as the memories were being accessed (see also Chapter 1).   
One possibility is that being instructed to decrease emotional intensity led 
participants to appraise the emotional and vivid details associated with events early on, 
thereby engaging MTL and emotion and visuospatial processing regions to a greater 
extent than the increase or maintain trials during the memory onset phase.  This early 
appraisal (which, by definition must occur before reappraisal) may have allowed 
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participants to subsequently down-regulate emotional responses early on (i.e., before the 
so-called point of no return).  Indeed, in striking contrast to the memory onset phase, the 
decrease trials engaged few regions to a greater extent than either the maintain or increase 
trials during the memory elaboration phase, consistent with the hypothesis that much of 
the work in down-regulating negative emotions occurred early on in AM recall.  This 
finding dovetails nicely with previous work suggesting that reappraisal (when compared 
to rumination) did not lead to greater neural activity (Kross et al., 2009) or connectivity 
((Fabiansson et al., 2012).  These studies presented regulation instructions only after 
AMs were being held in mind (and presumably after emotional appraisal had already 
occurred), which would correspond with our memory elaboration phase, perhaps 
explaining why they found few regions associated with reappraisal. 
Up-Regulation of Negative Emotions 
Whereas decreasing emotions was primarily associated with increased neural 
activity during the AM onset phase, increasing emotions was related to increased activity 
in both the instruction and elaboration phases.  Although both down- and up-regulation 
engaged cognitive control regions in the PFC during the instruction phase, up-regulation 
led to the most extensive PFC engagement in comparison to the maintain instruction 
phase.  In addition, directly comparing the increase and decrease conditions revealed 
widespread activity in regions previously implicated in the up-regulation of negative 
images (Ochsner et al., 2004), including in cognitive control regions in the PFC and 
anterior cingulate, visuospatial regions (e.g., cuneus, precuneus), as well as in the insula.  
This pattern of activity is consistent with prior research demonstrating that PFC, ACC, 
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insula, and amygdala activity is present when participants are expecting the presentation 
of unpleasant stimuli (e.g., Herwig et al., 2007).  In addition, this anticipatory activity is 
in line with behavioral reports from a post-scan debriefing questionnaire.  Whereas 
participants reported trying to ―relax‖ and ―let go of negative emotions‖ when viewing 
the decrease instructions, they reported ―tensing up‖ and preparing to ―engage with,‖ 
―relive,‖ and ―recall specific details about‖ the subsequent negative event.   
Despite this widespread anticipatory activity during the instruction phase, there 
was a relative paucity of activity during the memory onset phase when the increase 
condition was compared to either the decrease or maintain conditions.  Indeed, contrary 
to our expectations based on prior emotion regulation research, both the decrease and 
maintain conditions actually recruited greater levels of MTL (including hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and amygdala) and visuospatial (including cuneus and 
precuneus) activity as negative AMs were being accessed.  One possibility is that the 
anticipatory activity in emotion and visuospatial regions during the instruction phase 
enabled participants to more efficiently access the emotional and sensory details about 
negative events, leading to relatively less neural activity compared to negative AMs that 
had not been preceded by such anticipatory activity.  In other words, adapting a particular 
mindset to increase negative emotions before recall even occurs may facilitate retrieval of 
negative AMs. 
Although the onset period revealed an unexpected pattern of results, neural 
activity during the time when individuals were elaborating upon their AMs was 
consistent with our predictions based on prior cognitive reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross, 
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2005; 2008) and emotional AM (e.g., Botzung et al., 2010) experiments.  In particular, 
regions of medial PFC, MTL (including hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and 
amygdala), posterior visuospatial regions, and emotion processing regions (including 
insula) were all more engaged by the increase than decrease or maintain conditions 
during memory elaboration.  These results are in accordance with prior research on the 
up-regulation of emotions during the presentation of negative images (Ochsner et al., 
2004) and on the recall of emotionally intense AMs (Botzung et al., 2010).  In addition, 
the increased activity in visuospatial regions corresponds with the higher vividness 
ratings for the increase condition; such a relation between vividness ratings and posterior 
activity was previously found to be specific to the AM elaboration phase (Daselaar et al., 
2008).     
Interestingly, the increased activity in visuospatial regions and higher vividness 
ratings during the increase trials in the present study are in line with prior behavioral 
findings (see Chapter 1) demonstrating that up-regulation instructions were associated 
with increased subjective vividness ratings.  One proposed strategy for increasing 
emotional intensity in response to an emotional image is to imagine oneself as a central 
figure in the scene and to enhance the subjective feeling of experiencing the sights and 
sounds associated with that scene (Ochsner et al., 2004); a similar strategy of increasing 
or decreasing recall of specific sensory details may be a useful regulatory strategy during 
autobiographical recall (see Chapter 1 Discussion).  During AM recall, the elaboration 
phase has specifically been associated with the recall and elaboration of vivid sensory 
details (Conway et al., 2003; Daselaar et al., 2008).  A reasonable hypothesis, then, might 
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be that recalling and expounding upon vivid sensory details during the elaboration phase 
is a useful strategy for successfully up-regulating emotional intensity. 
Future Directions 
 An important next step in the research on emotion regulation and AM is testing 
how these two processes are linked on a behavioral and neural level in clinical 
populations, such as individuals with depression.  Indeed, emotion dysregulation and the 
pervasive maintenance of negative affect is considered a defining feature of depression, 
possibly because poor executive functioning leads to deficits in the ability to use 
cognitively demanding strategies like reappraisal (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).  In line 
with this hypothesis, participants with major depressive disorder exhibit both increased 
bilateral PFC (Johnstone et al., 2007) and increased amygdala and insula activity 
(Beauregard, Paquette, & Levesque, 2006) during cognitive reappraisal tasks using 
negative images, perhaps reflecting ineffective compensatory attempts at emotion 
regulation (see Denny et al., in press, for similar discussion).  Examining neural activity 
as depressed individuals attempt to down-regulate negative AMs might shed further light 
on their regulatory deficits:  For example, depressed individuals may engage PFC and 
insula/amygdala while accessing negative AMs (as our healthy participants did), but 
continue to sustain these activations when elaborating upon the details of their memories.  
In addition, if successfully increasing negative emotions about AMs involves adopting a 
particular mindset prior to recall, this could have important implications for clinical 
populations:  The pervasive sad mood associated with depression might lead to 
anticipatory neural responses similar to what we found during the increase instruction 
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phase.  In turn, depressed individuals may have greater success in accessing negative and 
vivid emotional details about events, leading to the perpetuation of their sad mood and 
depression.     
 One potential limitation of the current design is the risk that participants made 
their behavioral intensity ratings during the scan based on the regulation instructions 
rather than how intense they felt the recall was.  Although we cannot completely rule out 
this possibility of demand characteristics, we hoped to avoid this limitation by giving 
participants extensive instructions prior to the scan on how to make their ratings 
according to their experienced intensity and made it clear that their success in 
reappraising their emotions might vary from event to event.  The post-scan intensity 
ratings may offer further evidence that individuals genuinely reappraised their emotions 
about the events.  Participants were given the titles of each event they recalled in the 
scanner, but were not given any reminder of which reappraisal instruction had appeared 
with which AM.  Events that had previously appeared with the decrease instruction 
continued to be rated as significantly lower in intensity than events that had appeared 
with the increase instruction, suggesting that there may have been an effect of reappraisal 
on AM recall that lasted at least across the 0.5 hour delay between the scan and post-scan 
ratings.  An important question for future research to examine is how long-lasting 
reappraisal effects are, particularly in clinical populations undergoing cognitive 
behavioral therapy aimed at reducing the emotional intensity associated with cognitions 
(e.g., Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
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 Another potential limitation of the present experiment is that we asked 
participants to reappraise their emotions about negative events, thereby collapsing across 
events that may have been sad, angry, frightening, disgusting, etc.  It is possible that 
reappraising events associated with different discrete emotions or motivations (i.e., 
approach vs. avoidance; see Levine & Pizarro, 2006, for review) might differentially 
influence the neural regions associated with AM recall or lead to differences in 
reappraisal success.  Although previous meta-analyses suggest that discrete emotions are 
not associated with appreciable neural differences (Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et al., 
2002), one recent study measured regional cerebral blood flow with PET as individuals 
listened to scripts from sad, angry, and happy AMs (Marci et al., 2007) and revealed that 
only the angry (vs. neutral) AM scripts led to increased rCBF in PFC.  Anger-related 
AMs may evoke greater emotional arousal and autonomic activity than other types of 
negative events (Marci et al., 2007), thereby influencing the extent to which cognitive 
control is necessary to down-regulate responses, though this hypothesis remains to be 
tested. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, the present experiment modified a cognitive reappraisal task for use with 
AMs, and asked individuals to decrease, increase, or maintain the emotions associated 
with negative events while undergoing an fMRI scan.  Our results revealed that down- 
and up-regulation were differentiated by the time course over which they recruited neural 
activity:  Down-regulation primarily engaged regions during the memory onset phase, 
whereas up-regulation engaged regions during the instruction and memory elaboration 
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phases.  More broadly, this study suggests that invoking goals prior to the retrieval of 
AMs can influence the behavioral (e.g., emotional intensity and vividness ratings) and 
neural correlates associated with recall, in line with Conway‘s (2005) proposal of the 
goal-directed constructive nature of AM.  Indeed, the ability to flexibly reappraise 
emotional details may be a critical function of memory and have important implications 
for the development and treatment of clinical disorders.  
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Chapter 3 
Individual Differences in Reappraisal Frequency and the Neural Correlates of 
Autobiographical Memory Recall 
Introduction 
The recall of autobiographical memories can elicit emotional responses that we 
wish to regulate, yet we are not often given explicit instructions on how or when to 
regulate those responses in our day-to-day lives.  Rather, we likely rely on emotion 
regulation strategies that we spontaneously and habitually use (Gross & John, 2003), 
perhaps even automatically (see Arndt & Fujiwara, 2012; Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011; 
Williams, Bargh, Nocera & Gray, 2009, for similar discussion).  Therefore, it may be 
important to distinguish between investigations of how instructed emotion regulation use 
(see Chapters 1 and 2) and habitual or spontaneous emotion regulation use might 
influence autobiographical memory recall, particularly given evidence to suggest that 
affective disorders like depression are associated with deficits in the spontaneous (vs. 
instructed) use of reappraisal (Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnulle, Fischer & Gross 2010).  
Indeed, the constructive process of autobiographical memory recall is thought to be 
guided not only by short-term, ―in the moment‖ goals (akin to instructed emotion 
regulation, as in Chapters. 1 and 2), but also by long-term goals related to individual 
differences (Conway, 2005; Woike & Polo, 2001).     
Although there are a seemingly endless number of strategies that individuals can 
use to regulate their emotions (Gross, 1998), two habitual methods in particular have 
traditionally received the most attention in the literature (Gross & John, 2003).  The 
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first—reappraisal—is a cognitive strategy in which we reinterpret emotional information 
so as to increase or decrease its impact (Gross, 1998; see Chapters 1 and 2), and is 
thought to be used frequently in our daily lives (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006).  The 
second—expressive suppression—is a behavioral strategy that involves inhibiting 
responses (e.g., facial expressions) toward emotional information (Gross, 1998).  
Individual differences in the habitual use of emotion regulation strategies can be assessed 
via the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003).  The ERQ is a 
10-item measure that asks participants to rate the frequency with which they engage in 
reappraisal (e.g., ―I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation 
I‘m in‖) and expressive suppression (e.g., ―I control my emotions by not expressing 
them‖) on a 7-point Likert scale [1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)].   
Critically, the habitual use of cognitive reappraisal, as measured on the ERQ, has 
been linked to several positive outcomes.  Habitual reappraisers demonstrate greater 
instructed reappraisal success in response to emotional images (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, 
John, & Gross, 2012), more adaptive responses to an anger-inducing event (Mauss, Cook, 
Cheng, & Gross, 2007), as well as better subjective well-being and more frequent 
experience of positive emotions (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004), whereas the 
failure to habitually employ this strategy may contribute to the onset and maintenance of 
depressive symptomatology (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).  On the other hand, the habitual 
use of expressive suppression has been linked to poorer cognitive performance (Richards 
& Gross, 2000) and lower levels of subjective well-being (Gross & John, 2003; John & 
Gross, 2004).    
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To this point, the influence of habitual emotion regulation strategy use has 
primarily been investigated in relation to self-ratings of emotional well-being or success 
on instructed emotion regulation tasks using images (e.g., McRae et al., 2012).  However, 
there is some evidence that individual differences in habitual emotion regulation strategy 
use also can influence AM recall at a behavioral level.  For example, Rubin and Siegler 
(2004) showed that individuals who rated themselves as lower on the openness to 
feelings scale of a Big 5 personality trait measure (considered by the authors to reflect 
increased usage of expressive suppression) reported lower belief in the accuracy of their 
memories, lower subjective feelings of reliving the events, and a lower ability to retrieve 
sensory details upon AM recall. D‘Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006) provided 
further support for Rubin and Siegler‘s (2004) findings by directly testing the relation 
between responses on the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) and the phenomenological 
characteristics of AMs elicited with neutral cue words.  The chronic use of suppression 
was negatively correlated with the re-experiencing of sensory, contextual, and emotional 
details.  Though D‘Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006) found that individual 
differences in the use of reappraisal were unrelated to the phenomenological ratings made 
about AMs, Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema (2010) found that habitual use of cognitive 
reappraisal was linked to higher levels of positivity in emotional AM recall (see also 
Comblain et al., 2005). 
 It remains to be seen, however, whether habitual emotion regulation use can 
influence AM recall at a neural level.  Instructed reappraisal has repeatedly been 
associated with cortico-subcortical interactions that typically involve ―cold‖ cognitive 
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control regions in lateral and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (dACC) modulating activity in ―hot‖ emotion processing regions like the 
amygdala (see Chapter 2; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008, for reviews).  Several recent 
investigations have indicated that the chronic use of cognitive reappraisal is associated 
with both structural and functional differences in these regions previously implicated in 
instructed reappraisal studies.  For instance, habitual reappraisal has been associated with 
increased resting metabolic activity in left PFC (Kim, Cornwell, & Kim, 2012) and with 
greater dACC volume (Giuliani, Drabant, & Gross, 2011), regions that are thought to 
support the cognitive control necessary to invoke reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 
2008).  Dispositional mindfulness, a trait that relates to cognitive reappraisal, predicted 
increased activity in dorsomedial PFC and dACC as individuals in one study completed 
an instructed cognitive reappraisal task with emotional images (Modinos, Ormel, & 
Aleman, 2010).  Similarly, habitual reappraisal, as measured by the ERQ, has been 
associated with increased PFC and parietal lobe activity and reduced amygdala activity as 
healthy individuals view negative facial expressions (Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & 
Gross, 2009), and reduced amygdala activity in depressed individuals when anticipating 
the presentation of emotional information (Abler et al., 2007).   
 Taken together, this prior research suggests that habitual reappraisal can (a) 
influence AM recall at a behavioral level, and (b) influence neural activity during non-
AM tasks.  In the present study we sought to make the link between these extant 
literatures by examining whether habitual reappraisal influences neural activity during 
AM recall.  In particular, we investigated whether reappraisal scores on the ERQ were 
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correlated with neural activity as individuals recalled negative or neutral AMs without 
any explicit instructions to regulate their emotions about the events.  In a prior study 
(Chapter 2) we demonstrated that instructed reappraisal during negative AM recall 
modulates neural activity in a similar manner to instructed reappraisal during the 
presentation of negative images or film clips (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008).  Cognitive 
control related regions in dorsal and ventral lateral PFC and dACC, as well as emotional 
monitoring regions of dorsomedial PFC, were activated as individuals were instructed to 
increase or decrease the emotions associated with negative events.  Activity in both 
emotion processing (e.g., amygdala, insula) and imagery (e.g., precuneus, cuneus) 
regions was modulated according to the direction of reappraisal instructions (i.e., 
increased during up-regulation trials, decreased during down-regulation trials).   
 Here we first focus on those negative and neutral events from Chapter 2 for which 
individuals did not receive reappraisal instructions and were instead told to recall the 
events as they normally would, without trying to alter their emotions (i.e., the maintain 
conditions).  Given that individuals typically strive to regulate their emotions in a hedonic 
direction (e.g., decrease negative emotions; Tamir & Gross, 2011), we predicted that 
individual differences in habitual reappraisal would be associated with increases in 
cognitive control regions and decreases in emotion processing and imagery regions as 
participants recalled negative AMs, similar to the manner in which instructed down-
regulation modulated neural activity in these regions.  We also explored whether habitual 
reappraisal was associated with neural modulation specific to the recall of emotionally 
negative events, or whether such individual differences might also be linked more 
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generally to neural activity during the recall of emotionally neutral events.  Finally, as in 
Chapter 2, we took advantage of the relatively protracted time course of AM recall (e.g., 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) to explore whether individual differences influence 
neural activity as individuals are initially searching for an event in response to a memory 
cue (i.e., the memory onset phase), as they later elaborate on the details of the event they 
are holding in mind, or both.  Because we found that instructed down-regulation of 
negative AMs primarily influenced activity during the memory onset phase in Chapter 2, 
we predicted that habitual reappraisal might also be associated with activity during this 
earlier phase.      
Experiment 1 Methods 
Participants 
Data from 20 participants (12 female; M = 22.50 years, SD = 3.65 years) who 
completed individual differences measures and the neuroimaging component of an 
autobiographical memory task (see Chapter 2) were included in the present analyses.  
Participants had no history of psychiatric, neurological, or learning disorders, nor any 
history or current use of psychiatric medication.  The full methods from this study are 
reported in Chapter 2 and are briefly summarized below.  
Pre-Scan Data Collection Session   
AM recall task.  Participants generated 60 negative and 30 neutral specific AMs 
approximately 7-14 days before the scan session (M = 6.73 days, SD = 2.00 days, range = 
4-13 days).  For each event, participants created a short title that was specific enough that 
they would be able to associate the title with its referenced event at the scan session.  
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They also provided the age of each event and rated the events on how emotionally intense 
[1 (not at all) – 7(very)], negative [1 (not at all) – 7 (very)], positive [1 (not at all) – 7 
(very)], and vivid [1 (vague) – 7 (highly)] they were. 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.  To assess the frequency with which 
individuals report engaging in two distinct emotion regulation strategies, participants 
completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) at the pre-
scan session.  Gross and John (2003) reported good test-retest validity and internal 
reliability for each scale, and found that reported use of reappraisal and suppression were 
independent of one another.     
Scan Session 
AM recall task.  The stimuli and instructions used in this study were part of a 
larger investigation examining the neural correlates of increasing, decreasing, and 
maintaining the emotions associated with negative AMs (see Chapter 2).  For the 
purposes of the present experiment, we focused on those negative (n = 15) and neutral (n 
= 15) AMs that participants were instructed to recall as they normally would without 
trying to alter the emotions associated with the events (i.e., the maintain condition); these 
trials were pseudo-randomized and appeared inter-mixed with regulation trials that will 
not be discussed further here. 
 Each trial of the AM task began with a fixation cross (range = 1-7 sec, M = 3 sec) 
that was followed by the presentation of a maintain instruction (range = 3-9 sec, M = 6 
sec) that signaled participants that a negative or neutral memory cue would follow, and 
that they should recall the event as they normally would without altering their emotional 
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reaction to it.  The instruction phase was followed by either a negative or neutral AM title 
that participants had created at the pre-scan session.  Participants had a maximum of 12 
sec to recall the event; they indicated they had the fully-formed event in mind via a 
button-box.  After making a button press to signal the end of this memory onset phase, 
participants continued elaborating on the details of the event for the remainder of the 12 
sec trial (the memory elaboration phase).  Each trial ended with 4-sec rating scales 
concerning:  (a) Emotional Intensity [1 (low) – 7 (high)] and (b) Vividness [1 (low) – 7 
(high)].  These 30 trials were divided among 4 functional scanning runs. 
 Baseline sentence task.  Participants also completed sixteen trials of a baseline 
sentence task meant to control for the search and elaboration phases of AM recall 
(adapted from Addis et al., 2009).  These trials mirrored the AM recall task in their 
structure.  Each trial began with a fixation cross (range = 1-7 sec, M = 3 sec) that was 
followed by a Sentence instruction (range = 3-9 sec, M = 6 sec).  Following the 
instruction phase, participants saw 3 concrete, highly imageable and familiar nouns 
(selected from the Clark and Paivio extended norms; Clark & Paivio, 2004).  Participants 
had a maximum of 12 sec to arrange the 3 objects in size order and generate a sentence 
with the format ―X is smaller than Y is smaller than Z.‖  Once the sentence was generated 
and sub-vocalized, participants made a button press, thereby ending the sentence onset 
phase.  Participants continued to elaborate on the appearance and functions of the 3 
objects for the remainder of the 12-sec trial (i.e., the sentence elaboration phase).  Each 
sentence trial ended with 4-sec rating scales:  (a) Detail [1 (low) – 7 (high)], and (b) 
Vividness [1 (low) – 7 (high)].   
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Scanning parameters.  Images were acquired on a 3 Tesla Siemens Tim Trio 
MRI scanner using a 32-channel head coil.  Stimuli were presented using the MacStim 
presentation software.  All words, instructions, and rating scales used in the experiment 
appeared in white text (Arial 36-point font) on a black background.  Stimuli were 
projected onto a screen located at the back of the magnet bore, and participants viewed 
the stimuli using a mirror attached to the head coil. 
T1-weighted localizer images and a T1-weighted inversion recovery echo planar 
image required for auto-alignment were collected.  Anatomic data were collected with a 
multiplanar rapidly acquired gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (TR = 2200 ms; TE = 
1.64 ms; flip angle = 7°; field of view = 256 X 256 mm; slice thickness = 1 mm, no gap; 
1 X 1 X 1 mm resolution).  Functional images were collected using a T2*-weighted echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following parameters:  TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 
ms, FOV = 216 mm, flip angle = 85°.  Forty-seven interleaved coronal-oblique slices 
aligned perpendicular to the long axis of the hippocampus were collected in a 3 mm3 
matrix (slice thickness = 3 mm).       
Imaging data analysis.  Data were preprocessed and analyzed in SPM 8 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London) as described in Chapter 2.  The 
events of interest for the present analysis are as follows:  (a) Negative AM onset, (b) 
Neutral AM onset, (c) Sentence onset, (d) Negative AM elaboration, (e) Neutral AM 
elaboration, and (f) Sentence elaboration.  Because negative events took slightly longer 
(M = 3.45 sec, SD = 1.52 sec) to recall than neutral events (M = 3.00 sec, SD = 1.18 sec), 
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t(19) = 2.87, p = .01, the recall RT for each event was entered as a parametric regressor in 
the first-level analyses.   
Contrasts between the various trial types were computed as described below, and 
the resulting contrast images were entered into second-level, random-effects one-sample 
t-tests.  Participants‘ scores on the reappraisal and suppression scales of the ERQ were 
entered as covariates into each t-test; although we were primarily interested in the 
relation between reported reappraisal frequency and neural activity during AM recall, we 
also controlled for suppression to account for any neural activity that might be related to 
use of emotion regulation strategies in general.  We first report the neural activity present 
for each contrast described below while controlling for reappraisal and suppression 
frequency.  We subsequently report the positive and negative correlations between 
reappraisal scores on the ERQ and whole-brain neural activity for each contrast.  The 
statistical threshold for each t-test was set at p < .001 with a 5-voxel threshold extent.  
Experiment 1 Results 
Behavioral Results   
The average reappraisal score for Experiment 1s was 5.08 (SD = .89), and the 
average suppression score was 3.08 (SD = 1.50).  Consistent with prior findings (Gross & 
John, 2003), reported use of reappraisal and suppression scales was not related, r(20) = 
.18, p = .46.  In addition, neither scale was associated with emotional intensity ratings for 
negative or neutral AMs, ps > .23, nor with vividness ratings for negative or neutral AMs, 
ps > .46. 
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Imaging Results:  Negative AM Recall > Sentence Baseline Task 
Onset Phase.  We first examined the neural activity present as individuals 
recalled negative events referenced by their self-generated memory cues versus generated 
sentences as part of the baseline task, while controlling for individual differences in self-
reported reappraisal and suppression frequencies (see Fig. 3.1a).  Consistent with prior 
investigations of AM recall (see reviews by Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Svoboda et al., 
2006), this contrast revealed activity in left ventrolateral PFC (BA 47), left lateral 
temporal lobes (BAs 21 and 22), and right precuneus (BA 19). 
 We next examined which regions in the negative AM > sentence onset contrast 
were positively correlated with reappraisal frequency while controlling for suppression 
frequency (see Table 3.1; Fig. 3.1a).  In line with our predictions that PFC activity would 
be correlated with reappraisal frequency, higher reappraisal scores on the ERQ were 
associated with greater activity in right ventrolateral PFC (BA 11).  In addition, habitual 
reappraisal was positively correlated with activity in left posterior cingulate (BAs 23 and 
24/32).   
 There were also several regions in the negative AM > sentence onset contrast that 
were negatively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency (Table 3.1; Fig. 3.1a).  
Contrary to our expectations, lower reappraisal frequency was associated with small 
clusters of activity in bilateral dorsolateral PFC (BAs 44 and 46), right frontal pole (BA 
10), and dorsomedial PFC (BA 6), cognitive control related regions implicated in studies 
of instructed reappraisal (see Chapter 2; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008).  However, in line 
with our hypothesis that increased reappraisal would be associated with decreased 
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activity in emotion processing regions, there was also a negative correlation between 
bilateral insula (BA 13) engagement and reappraisal frequency during negative memory 
(vs. sentence) onset.  Finally, activity in bilateral temporal lobes (e.g., BAs 21, 22, and 
38) and right inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), as well as in small clusters of right-
lateralized cingulate gyrus (BA 24) and precuneus (BA 19), were negatively related to 
reappraisal frequency.     
Elaboration Phase.  We next examined the neural activity present as individuals 
elaborated upon the details associated with negative AMs versus the objects in the 
sentences they had generated (Fig. 3.1b).  When controlling for both reported reappraisal 
and suppression frequencies, negative AM elaboration was associated with activity in left 
dorsal (BA 9) and ventral (BA 45) lateral PFC, as well as medial (BA 6), PFC and right 
superior temporal gyrus (BA 39). 
 There was no activity during the elaboration phase that was positively correlated 
with reappraisal frequency.  In contrast, activity in several regions in bilateral insula (BA 
13) was negatively correlated with reappraisal frequency (Table 3.1; Fig. 3.1b), as was a 
small region of left ventrolateral PFC (BA 47).  Greater activity in left posterior cingulate 
(BA 24), right superior temporal gyrus (BA 42), and right inferior parietal lobe (BA40) 
during negative AM elaboration was also associated with lower reappraisal frequency.  
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Table 3.1.  Regions in which neural activity was positively or negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency during negative AM onset and elaboration (vs. the baseline 
sentence task).    
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Negative AM Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Superior frontal gyrus 11 R 20 44 -12 4.72 6 
Limbic        
Cingulate gyrus  23 L -18 -42 24 5.06 8 
 24/32 L -18 0 41 4.40 9 
Negative AM Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Negative Correlation 
Reappraisal negative correlation 
Frontal        
Inferior frontal gyrus 44 R 53 5 22 4.66 9 
 46 L -40 37 7 4.04 5 
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L 0 -9 58 4.42 6 
Precentral gyrus 6 R 57 1 11 4.31 8 
 4 R 53 -7 41 4.18 6 
Temporal        
Middle temporal gyrus 21 R 63 -51 -1 4.74 6 
Superior temporal gyrus 22 L -36 -34 16 6.28 10 
 22 L -42 -25 5 4.14 5 
 41 L -55 -21 14 4.23 6 
 41 R 51 -30 14 5.14 20 
 42 R 51 -17 8 4.38 8 
 21/38 R 38 -3 -13 4.02 5 
Parietal        
Precuneus 19 R 22 -72 31 4.33 6 
Inferior parietal lobe 40 R 46 -32 22 5.26 21 
Postcentral gyrus 43 L -44 -18 21 4.81 11 
Limbic        
Cingulate gyrus 24 R 2 -8 41 4.76 8 
Insula        
 13 L -42 -17 3 4.89 10 
 13 L -44 -1 -3 4.15 5 
Other        
Thalamus  L -18 -13 8 5.95 7 
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Negative AM Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reappraisal Positive 
Correlation 
no regions survived p < .001 
Negative AM Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reappraisal Negative 
Correlation 
Frontal        
Inferior frontal gyrus 47 R 28 27 -5 4.70 5 
Temporal        
Superior temporal gyrus 42 R 50 -2 7 4.31 8 
Parietal        
Inferior parietal lobe 40 R 63 -41 32 3.97 7 
Limbic        
Cingulate gyrus 24 L -10 -17 45 6.02 8 
Insula 13 L -40 -20 21 6.81 31 
 13 L -46 -10 0 4.31 8 
 13 R 44 8 3 4.35 7 
    
Neutral AM Recall > Sentence Baseline Task 
 Onset Phase.  To determine whether individual differences in emotion regulation 
strategies influence neural activity even when emotionally neutral events are being 
recalled, we next considered the onset phase of neutral AMs versus the baseline sentence 
task while controlling for reported frequencies of reappraisal and suppression (see Fig. 
3.1c).  Consistent with the proposed role of left-lateralized PFC in AM search processes 
(Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007), recalling neutral AMs was associated with activity in left 
ventrolateral (BA 47) and dorsolateral (BAs 6, 8, and 9) PFC.  Neutral memory onset was 
also associated with bilateral medial temporal (parahippocampal gyrus) and left lateral 
temporal lobe (BAs 21, 22, 38, and 39) activity.  Posterior activity throughout the 
bilateral occipital lobes (BAs 18 and 19), bilateral lingual gyrus (BA 17), bilateral 
cingulate gyrus (BAs 24 and 29), and right fusiform gyrus (BA 37) was also evident.  
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Finally, left insula (BA 13) was more active for neutral memory onset than sentence 
onset. 
 The overall pattern of results when examining which regions in the neutral > 
sentence onset phase were associated with habitual reappraisal was more in line with our 
expectations based on prior examinations of chronic reappraisal during negative facial 
expression perception (Drabant et al., 2009; see Table 3.2; Fig. 3.1c).  As individuals 
accessed the neutral events referenced by their personalized memory cues, individual 
differences in reappraisal frequency were positively correlated with greater activity in 
both right dorsolateral PFC (BA 9) and right ventrolateral PFC (BA 11), as well as left 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC, BA 24/32).  Reappraisal was also positively 
correlated with bilateral activity in the lateral temporal lobes (BAs 22, 37, and 42), as 
well as in left middle occipital gyrus (BA 18/19).  In contrast, activity in only a region of 
left thalamus was negatively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency.    
 Elaboration Phase.  Elaborating upon the details of neutral events (vs. upon the 
objects recalled as part of the sentence baseline task) recruited activity throughout left 
superior and middle frontal gyri (BAs 6, 8, and 9), as well as bilateral medial PFC (BAs 8 
and 9) (Fig. 3.1d).  Greater activity was also evident in left posterior cingulate (BA 31) 
and right insula (BA 13) (see Fig. 3.1d).   
   During neutral event (vs. sentence) elaboration, greater reappraisal frequency 
was associated with greater activity in two regions of right-lateralized dorsomedial PFC 
(Table 3.2; Fig. 3.1d).  In contrast, reappraisal scores were not negatively correlated with 
any regions during neutral AM elaboration. 
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Table 3.2.  Regions in which neural activity was positively or negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency during neutral AM onset and elaboration (vs. the baseline 
sentence task).    
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Neutral AM Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Middle frontal gyrus 11 R 28 46 -14 5.18 17 
Inferior frontal gyrus 9 R 44 5 27 4.08 6 
Temporal        
Superior temporal gyrus 42 R 40 -31 9 4.62 10 
 22 R 61 -15 3 4.34 5 
 22 L -61 -23 5 6.71 10 
Inferior temporal gyrus 37/19 L -40 -64 -5 4.18 5 
Occipital        
Middle occipital gyrus 18/19 L -26 -81 19 4.29 5 
Limbic        
Cingulate gyrus 24/32 L -22 7 31 5.20 5 
Neutral AM Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Negative Correlation 
Other        
Thalamus  L 0 -14 1   
Neutral AM Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Medial frontal gyrus 8 R 16 24 43 5.03 6 
 9 R 10 44 24 4.24 10 
Neutral AM Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reappraisal Negative Correlation 
no regions survived p < .001 
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Memory Elaboration PhaseMemory Onset Phase
Negative AMs > Sentence Baseline
Neutral AMs > Sentence Baseline
Regions positively correlated with reappraisal
Regions negatively correlated with reappraisal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative AM vs. Neutral AM Recall 
 Onset Phase.  We also directly compared activity during the onset phases of 
negative versus neutral AMs while controlling for individual differences in emotion 
regulation strategies (see Fig. 3.2a).  Negative AMs recruited greater activity in bilateral 
a b 
c d 
Figure 3.1.  (a) Neural activity during the negative AM vs. sentence baseline onset 
phase. Coronal section shows a region of right insula (Tal:  x = 46, y = -32, z = 22) 
that was negatively correlated with reappraisal frequency.  (b) Neural activity 
during the negative AM vs. sentence baseline elaboration phase.  Coronal section 
shows a region of left insula (Tal:  x = -40, y = -20, z = 21) that was negatively 
correlated with reappraisal frequency.  (c) Neural activity during the neutral AM 
vs. sentence baseline onset phase.  (d) Neural activity during the neutral AM vs. 
sentence baseline elaboration phase.  For all contrasts, regions in green were 
positively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency and regions in purple 
were negatively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency. Activity is 
significant at p < .001 and a 5-voxel threshold extent.  
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frontal pole (BA 10).  In addition, consistent with these regions‘ role in recalling 
emotionally intense AMs (Botzung et al., 2010), negative AMs engaged medial PFC (BA 
10), precuneus (BA 7), and posterior cingulate (BA 31) to a greater extent than neutral 
AMs.  Negative memory onset was also associated with greater right-lateralized insula 
activity (BA 13), as well as greater activity in left angular gyrus (BA 39) and throughout 
the right lateral temporal lobe (BAs 21, 37, and 42).   
 Our findings regarding the link between habitual reappraisal and neural activity 
during the negative > neutral AM recall contrasts were overall in line with the patterns 
evident from our comparisons of negative and neutral events to the sentence baseline task 
(Fig. 3.2a).  Higher reappraisal frequency was not associated with any greater neural 
activity when directly comparing negative and neutral AM onset.  In contrast, lower 
reappraisal frequency was again associated with widespread activity, including 
throughout bilateral dorsal (BAs 9 and 46) and ventral (BAs 11 and 47) lateral PFC and 
right frontal pole (BA 10), when comparing negative to neutral AM onset.  However, as 
we anticipated, lower reappraisal scores were also associated with increased activity in 
medial temporal lobe and emotion processing regions, including right parahippocampal 
gyrus (BA 30), left amygdala, and bilateral insula (BA 13).  This activity also extended 
laterally into the middle (BA 21) and superior (BAs 22, 41, and 42) temporal gyri.  
Finally, lower reappraisal frequency was associated with greater activity throughout the 
bilateral parietal (BAs 7 and 40) and occipital (BAs 18 and 19) lobes. 
 Elaboration Phase.  A direct comparison between the elaboration phases of 
negative and neutral AMs revealed a similar pattern to the activity present during the 
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onset phase (Fig. 3.2b).  When controlling for reported use of emotion regulation 
strategies, negative AM elaboration recruited left-lateralized dorsal (BAs 9 and 46) and 
ventral (BA 47) PFC, left superior frontal gyrus (BA 6), left insula (BA 13), and left 
superior temporal gyrus (BA 22).  Negative AM elaboration also recruited several 
posterior regions, including bilateral cuneus (BAs 17 and 30), right lingual gyrus (BA 
18), right inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19), left fusiform gyrus, and left middle occipital 
gyrus (BA 18).      
 As during the memory onset phase, there were no regions that were positively 
correlated with reappraisal frequency during the memory elaboration phase.  However, 
activity in several regions was negatively correlated with reappraisal frequency (Fig. 
3.2b).  In particular, lower use of reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy was 
associated with greater activity in right frontal pole (BA 10) and right dorsolateral PFC 
(BA 9), as well as bilateral dACC (BA 32/24).  Lower reappraisal scores were also linked 
to greater activity in bilateral insula (BA 13) and in bilateral cuneus (BA 17). 
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Negative AMs > Neutral AMs
Memory Elaboration PhaseMemory Onset Phase
Regions positively correlated with reappraisal
Regions negatively correlated with reappraisal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
 We investigated how individual differences in the use of an emotion regulation 
strategy—reappraisal—were related to neural activity as individuals initially accessed 
and later elaborated upon the details of neutral and negative autobiographical memories 
Figure 3.2.  (a) Neural activity during the negative AM vs. neutral AM onset phase 
(in blue). Saggital section shows a region of right parahippocampal gyrus (Tal:  x = 
22, y = -39, z = -1) that was negatively correlated with reappraisal frequency.  (b) 
Neural activity during the negative AM vs. neutral AM elaboration phase.  Saggital 
section shows a region of left dACC (Tal:  x = -2, y = 39, z = 9) that was negatively 
correlated with reappraisal frequency.  For all contrasts, regions in green were 
positively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency and regions in purple 
were negatively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency. Activity is 
significant at p < .001 and a 5-voxel threshold extent.  
a b 
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in response to self-generated memory cues.  Our findings were partially consistent with 
prior work (Drubant et al., 2009) suggesting that everyday use of reappraisal is associated 
with increased prefrontal and decreased emotion processing activity during the 
presentation of negative information.  For example, when compared to a baseline task, 
higher reported use of reappraisal in daily life was associated with greater activity in 
ventrolateral PFC during negative memory onset and with ventral and dorsal lateral PFC 
and dACC during neutral memory onset.  These PFC regions are frequently implicated in 
the cognitive control processes that support instructed reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross, 
2005; 2008).  In contrast, for negative AM recall, habitual reappraisal was negatively 
correlated with activity in regions associated with emotion processing, such as the insula 
and the amygdala, consistent with research demonstrating overall reduced amygdala 
activity during the processing of negative information for individuals who report greater 
everyday reappraisal use (Drubant et al., 2009).  This finding may also be in line with our 
prediction that in the absence of instructed reappraisal goals, individuals who chronically 
use reappraisal default to hedonic emotion regulation (i.e., decreasing negative emotions; 
see Tamir & Gross, 2011).      
 Despite the general similarities between these and prior results, our results also 
differed from prior work, particularly when considering the valence (i.e., negative vs. 
neutral) of the events being recalled.  Though higher reappraisal scores on the ERQ were 
associated with increased ventrolateral PFC activity during negative AM (vs. baseline) 
onset, lower reappraisal scores were associated with a more extensive pattern of PFC 
activity during negative AM onset (vs. either baseline or neutral recall), including activity 
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in dorsolateral PFC and medial PFC.  This finding is particularly interesting given 
evidence that activity in these PFC regions increases during both instructed (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005; 2008) and spontaneous/habitual reappraisal in response to negative images 
(Modinos et al., 2011) or facial expressions (Drubant et al., 2009).   
Interestingly, Drubant et al. (2009) reported that PFC activity related to chronic 
reappraisal, particularly in dorsolateral regions, was to a smaller spatial extent than 
activity in dorsolateral PFC during instructed reappraisal.  One possibility put forth by 
Drubant et al. (2009) is that frequent or habitual use of an emotion regulation strategy 
may lead to greater automaticity in its use as well as ―neural efficiency‖ that requires 
fewer prefrontal resources to modulate emotional experience.  If this is the case, perhaps 
individuals who use reappraisal with less frequency require greater frontally-mediated 
cognitive resources to regulate the emotions associated with negative AMs.  This may be 
especially relevant for dorsolateral and medial PFC, given these regions‘ more general 
roles in reappraisal (manipulating information in working memory and self-referential 
appraisals of emotional states, respectively; see Denny, Silvers, & Ochsner, in press, for 
review).  Additionally, because the recall of these negative AMs occurred in the context 
of instructed reappraisal for 30 other AMs (see Chapter 2), we cannot rule out the 
possibility that practice with reappraising negative AMs afforded individuals who already 
habitually use reappraisal a greater neural efficiency even when not explicitly instructed 
to regulate emotions.  On the other hand, ventrolateral PFC may have been positively 
correlated with chronic reappraisal because of its purported role in selecting appropriate, 
contextually-specific reappraisals (Denny et al., in press); in other words, because 
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reappraisals would change depending on the content of a particular AM, the neural 
efficiency hypothesis may not apply to this region.   
Although neural activity was associated with habitual reappraisal use during both 
the onset and elaboration phases (particularly for negative AMs), these associations were 
most widespread during the memory onset phases.  These findings are consistent with our 
finding that instructed down-regulation of negative emotions engaged the greatest neural 
activity during the memory onset phase (Chapter 2).  As we and others (Sheppes & 
Gross, 2011) have previously discussed, instructed reappraisal seems to be most effective 
early on in the emotion generation process (Sheppes & Gross, 2011).  The present results 
provide some preliminary evidence that habitual reappraisal may similarly influence 
neural activity early on as events are initially being recalled and emotion appraisal is 
presumably in an early stage.  
Overall, the results from this study suggest that the neural correlates of AM recall 
can be influenced by habitual use of reappraisal, regardless of whether events are 
emotional or neutral.  However, there are some limitations associated with the design of 
this study that we sought to address in a second study.  First, as noted above, the recall of 
the negative and neutral events examined here occurred in the context of the instructed 
reappraisal of negative events.  It is possible that experience with these instructions 
influenced regulatory goals even for trials with no explicit regulatory instructions.  
Therefore, it is desirable to examine how habitual regulatory goals influence neural 
activity in a task completely absent of any regulation instructions.  
129 
 
A second possible limitation is that individuals in the current study were 
constrained to recalling events that they had recalled relatively recently at a pre-scan 
session.  Although this methodology affords greater experimental control over the stimuli 
used in the study (e.g., negative and neutral events in the present study could be matched 
on their subjective ratings of vividness), we cannot rule out the possibility that the recent 
recall encouraged participants, particularly those high in reported habitual reappraisal, to 
have recently regulated the emotions associated with events.  In addition, the use of self-
generated memory titles as cues in the present study may allow for more direct access to 
the memory of an event, thereby bypassing some of the neural activity associated with 
the more effortful and strategic search for a memory that occurs in the absence of a 
personalized memory cue (see Addis, Knapp, Roberts, & Schacter, 2012).  It is possible 
that there is additional reappraisal-related activity that takes place during this effortful 
memory onset phase above and beyond that evident during the more direct access onset 
phase.   
An alternative method to providing participants with personalized memory cues 
based on pre-scan sessions is to show participants generic cue words (e.g., ―restaurant‖) 
and ask them to generate an AM somehow related to that word (e.g., ―The time I met my 
parents for lunch at a hotel in Boston‖) while they are being scanned.  Although this 
method affords less experimental control over the types of memories that are generated 
(see Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007, for discussion), it does allow for the examination of 
neural activity as individuals perform a more generative memory search process and may 
shed further light on how chronic reappraisal influences the memory onset phase.  
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A related limitation is that individuals in this first study were constrained to recall 
only those events that were specific (i.e., had occurred only once, at a particular time and 
place, and had lasted for less than a day).  However, autobiographical events can vary in 
their specificity, and therefore include not only those events that are specific, but also 
those events that are considered general because they are repeated multiple times (e.g., 
―Every time I‘ve met my parents for lunch‖) or temporally extended beyond the confines 
of a single day (e.g., ―The week-long vacation I spent with my parents in Boston‖).  
Specific and general AMs are behaviorally and psychologically distinct (Williams & 
Dritschel, 1992; Holland et al., 2011; Addis et al., 2004).  For example, specific AMs are 
more cognitively demanding to recall (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), are more 
detailed than general events, and their retrieval engages greater neural activity in medial 
temporal lobe and posterior sensory processing regions than general AMs (Holland et al., 
2011; Addis et al., 2004).  Additionally, general (vs. specific) events may be more likely 
to be recalled in the service of emotion regulation (e.g., to avoid the recall of specific 
emotional details; Williams et al., 2007).  Therefore, it is possible that individual 
differences in reappraisal use might influence AM recall differentially depending on the 
specificity of the event being recalled.     
In Experiment 2, we explored how individual differences in habitual cognitive 
reappraisal use were related to the neural activity that occurred during AM onset and 
elaboration when individuals were not constrained to recalling specific or emotional 
events that had previously been recalled at a pre-scan session.  Rather, we presented 
individuals with neutral cue words and allowed them to generate and elaborate upon 
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events that were either specific or general in nature.  Though we did not have specific 
predictions for how habitual reappraisal would influence general AM recall, we predicted 
that the links between habitual reappraisal and specific AM recall would mirror the 
findings from the neutral AM recall > baseline comparison in Experiment 1, such that 
higher reappraisal scores on the ERQ would be associated with greater fronto temporo-
occipital activity, particularly during the earlier memory onset phase.     
Experiment 2 Methods 
Participants   
Data from 23 participants (13 female; M = 21.74 years, SD = 2.28 years) were 
included in the present analyses.  All participants completed individual differences 
measures and the neuroimaging component of an autobiographical memory task whose 
results were previously reported (Holland, Addis, & Kensinger, 2011).  Participants had 
no history of psychiatric, neurological, or learning disorders, nor any history or current 
use of psychiatric medication.  Informed consent was obtained from all participants in 
accordance with the Massachusetts General Hospital Institutional Review Board. 
Materials 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.  Participants completed the reappraisal and 
suppression subscales of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) prior to the scanning portion of 
the study.  
Stimuli.  A total of 72 neutral nouns were selected from the Clark and Paivio 
(2004) extended norms.  Selected nouns were high in familiarity, imagability, and 
concreteness, but low in emotional ratings.  The nouns were randomly assigned to serve 
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as a cue word or as a noun for the control task (explained below), and counterbalanced 
across participants.  These nouns were distributed across 4 lists; each list had a total of 12 
cue words and 6 control task words.  
Scan Session 
AM cue word task.  Participants viewed a total of 48 cue words while 
undergoing a slow event-related fMRI scan.  These cue words were divided among 4 runs 
and were presented with the instruction ―Remember.‖  Each cue word trial lasted for 26 
sec.  Participants were instructed that whenever they saw a noun with the instructions 
―Remember,‖ they should recall a memory from their past that was either directly or 
indirectly related to the word they saw on the screen. As soon as they had a memory in 
mind, participants used their right hand to press a button on a button box to indicate that 
they had generated a memory. This button press served to demarcate the end of the onset 
phase of the AM.  Once the button press was made, participants saw the word 
―Elaborate‖ for the remainder of the 26 sec trial, during which time they maintained and 
elaborated on the details of the memory they generated.  At the end of the 26 sec trial, 
participants were asked to rate how detailed their memory was on a 5-point scale using 
the button box.  The rating scale appeared for a maximum of 5 sec.  Following the rating 
scale, a fixation cross appeared for a variable amount of time (range = 4-12 sec) to create 
jitter between trials.   
Sentence control task.  We adapted a sentence generation task from Addis, 
Wong, and Schacter (2007) to control for the onset (i.e., searching for and integrating 
multiple pieces of information) and elaboration (i.e., visuospatial processing) phases of 
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the AM task.  In each of the four runs, six 26 sec control trials were randomly intermixed 
with the 12 AM cue words.  Control trials consisted of a noun presented with the 
instruction ―Sentence.‖ When participants saw the instruction ―Sentence,‖ they generated 
two semantically-related nouns to the presented noun, and then put the words into a 
sentence with the format ―X is smaller than Y is smaller than Z‖ according to the physical 
size of the objects.  Once participants had sub-vocalized this sentence, they made a button 
press, which demarcated the end of the sentence onset phase.  Following the button press, 
the instruction ―Elaborate‖ appeared on the screen, during which time participants 
silently thought about and elaborated on the appearance and functions of the 3 objects for 
the remainder of the 26 sec trial.  At the end of the 26 sec, participants were given up to 5 
sec to rate how detailed their sentence generation and elaboration was on a 5-point scale 
using the button box.  As with the AM task, each trial was followed by a variable amount 
of fixation time (range = 4-12 sec) to create inter-trial jitter.   
  Post-scan interview.  Following the scanning portion of the experiment, after an 
approximately 30 minute delay, participants were asked to briefly tell an experimenter 
about the memories they recalled while they were in the scanner in response to the 48 cue 
words that appeared with the instruction ―Remember.‖  Each memory was coded on-line 
for its level of specificity.  A memory was coded as:  ―Specific‖ if it referred to a unique 
event that occurred at one time, one place, and lasted for a day or less; ―General‖ if it 
referred to an event that was either repeated (e.g., every Thanksgiving) or extended in 
time (e.g., a vacation that lasted for a week); or ―Omission‖ if the participant did not 
generate a memory in response to a word or could not recall the memory they had 
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generated in the scanner.  These codings for specificity were used to create post-hoc 
specific and general AM conditions. During the post-scan interviews, participants were 
also asked to provide the following information about each memory:  (a) approximately 
how old they were when the memory occurred, (b) how emotionally intense they found 
the recall (not the actual occurrence) of the event to be on a 5-point scale, and (c) how 
much detail they were able to recall about each memory on the same 5-point scale they 
saw in the scanner.  
Scanning parameters.  Images were acquired on a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Avanto 
MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany) using a standard birdcage head coil.  Stimuli were 
presented using the MacStim presentation software.  All words, instructions, and digits 
used in the experiment appeared in white text (Arial 36-point font) on a black 
background.  Stimuli were projected onto a screen located at the back of the magnet bore, 
and participants viewed the stimuli using a mirror attached to the head coil. 
T1-weighted localizer images and a T1-weighted inversion recovery echo planar 
image required for auto-alignment were collected.  Anatomic data were collected with a 
multiplanar rapidly acquired gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (TR = 2730 ms; TE = 
3.39 ms; flip angle = 40; field of view = 256 X 256 mm; acquisition matrix = 256 X 
256; slice thickness = 1.33 mm, no gap; 1 X 1 X 1.33 mm resolution).  Functional images 
were collected using a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the 
following parameters:  TR = 3000 ms, TE = 40 ms, FOV = 200 mm, flip angle = 90.  
Twenty-eight interleaved axial-oblique slices aligned with the anterior 
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commissure/posterior commissure line were collected in a 3.125 X 3.125 X 3.84 mm 
matrix (slice thickness = 3.12 mm, 0.6 mm skip between slices).   
 Imaging data analysis.  Preprocessing and data analysis were conducted in 
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London).  Preprocessing steps 
were as follows:  (1) slice timing correction, (2) motion correction using a six parameter, 
rigid body transformation algorithm, (3) normalization to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) template (resampling at 3 mm isotropic voxels), and (4) spatial 
smoothing using a 7.6 mm full-width half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. 
For each individual, the following event types were first modeled and analyzed 
using the general linear model approach on a voxel-by-voxel basis:  (a) Specific Memory 
Onset, (b) Specific Memory Elaboration, (c) General Memory Onset, (d) General 
Memory Elaboration, (e) Sentence Onset, (f) Sentence Elaboration, and (g) Memory 
Omission (i.e., any trials for which a participant failed to generate a memory during the 
scan or could not recall the memory they had generated during the post-scan interview). 
Contrasts between the various trial types were computed as described below, and the 
resulting contrast images were then entered into second-level random-effects one-sample 
t-tests.   
As in Experiment 1, participants‘ scores on the reappraisal and suppression scales 
of the ERQ were entered as covariates into each t-test.  We first report the neural activity 
present for each contrast described below while controlling for reappraisal and 
suppression frequency.  We subsequently report the positive and negative correlations 
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between reappraisal scores on the ERQ and whole-brain neural activity for each contrast.  
The statistical threshold for each t-test was set at p < .001 with a 5-voxel threshold extent. 
Experiment 2 Results 
Behavioral Results 
Participants recalled AMs to an average of 45.23 (SD = 3.17) of the 48 cue words.  
Of these, an average of 26.94 (SD = 7.32) were coded as specific and 15.87 (SD = 6.83) 
were coded as general.  Specific and general events did not differ in the amount of time it 
took to construct them [Mspecific = 5.48 sec, SD = 1.86; Mgeneral = 5.73 sec, SD = 2.24; t(20) 
= 1.00, p = .33], or in their reported emotionality [Mspecific = 2.29, SD = .71; Mgeneral = 
2.20, SD = .69; t(20) = 1.08, p = .29].  In line with prior research suggesting that specific 
AMs are more detailed than general AMs (e.g., Hennessey Ford, Addis, & Giovanello, 
2011), participants rated their specific AMs as more detailed (M = 3.63, SD = .47) than 
their general AMs (M = 3.29, SD = .61), t(22) = 2.69, p = .01. 
The average reappraisal score in Experiment 2 was 5.08 (SD = 1.01), and the 
average suppression score was 3.34 (SD = 1.17).  Once again, the reported frequencies of 
reappraisal and suppression were unrelated, r(23) = .08, p = .70.  Neither scale was 
associated with reported emotional intensity for either specific or general AMs, rs < .06, 
ps > .78, and neither scale was associated with the percentage of specific or general AMs 
recalled, rs < -.21, ps > .21.  Higher reappraisal scores were marginally correlated with 
reported detail of specific AMs, r(23) = .40, p < .06, though suppression scores were 
unrelated to reported specific AM detail and reappraisal and suppression scores were 
unrelated to the reported detail levels of general AMs, all ps > .56. 
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Imaging Results:  Specific AM Recall vs. Sentence Baseline 
 Onset Phase.  The contrast examining specific versus sentence onset, while 
controlling for reported reappraisal and suppression frequency, revealed several regions 
previously associated with the AM retrieval network (Fig. 3.3a; Cabeza & St. Jacques, 
2007; Svoboda et al., 2006).  Activity was evident in left ventrolateral PFC (BA 47) and 
left superior frontal gyrus (BA 8), as well as in dACC (BA 32) and several regions 
throughout left medial PFC (BA 10) and bilateral insula (BA 13).  This contrast also 
revealed activity in both the lateral (bilateral BAs 21, 22, and 39) and medial temporal 
(amygdala) lobes.  Posterior regions in the parietal (e.g., bilateral inferior parietal lobe, 
BA 40; right precuneus, BA 7) and occipital (e.g., bilateral cuneus, BA 19; bilateral 
lingual gyrus, BA 19) were more active during the onset of specific AMs, as was 
posterior cingulate (BA 29). 
 We next considered which regions were associated with higher reappraisal scores 
during specific AM onset (Table 3.3; Fig. 3.3a).  This analysis revealed a more 
widespread pattern of regions that were positively correlated with reappraisal scores than 
did the neutral AM > sentence onset contrast in Experiment 1.  Some of the activity 
overlapped with that revealed in Experiment 1, including in right dorsolateral PFC (BA 
9) and left dACC (BA 32/24).  Greater reported reappraisal frequency was further 
associated with activity in several PFC regions, including bilateral middle (BAs 6 and 10) 
and superior (BAs 6 and 8) frontal gyri, right medial PFC (BA 6) and frontal pole (BA 
10/46), as might be expected given these regions‘ role in reappraisal processes (Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005; 2008).  Interestingly, greater reappraisal frequency was also correlated 
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with greater activity in left hippocampus and left amygdala, as well as bilateral insula 
(BA 13).  Finally, left posterior cingulate (BA 24), left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), and 
right superior parietal lobe (BA 7) during specific AM onset were related to more 
frequent use of reappraisal. 
 In contrast to the widespread neural activity that was positively correlated with 
reported reappraisal during the specific AM onset phase, there were no regions that were 
negatively correlated with this individual difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Table 3.3.  Regions in which neural activity was positively or negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency during specific AM onset (vs. baseline sentence task onset).    
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Specific AM Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Medial Frontal Gyrus 11 R 4 50 -18 4.79 11 
 6 R 12 -8 65 4.37 11 
 6 L -8 -16 65 4.57 25 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 R 30 44 24 5.03 62 
 6 L -42 -1 50 3.99 7 
 10/46 L -40 43 11 3.84 5 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 R 12 30 48 4.29 13 
 8 L -24 41 38 4.13 19 
Temporal        
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -67 -29 -7 4.01 6 
Medial Temporal        
Hippocampus  L -30 -28 -9 5.35 34 
Amygdala  L -30 -6 -10 3.70 5 
Parietal        
Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 L -44 -54 56 4.96 10 
 40 L -51 -52 39 4.14 29 
 40 L -55 -48 47 3.94 9 
Superior Parietal Lobule 7 R 46 -60 53 5.40 23 
Limbic        
Cingulate gyrus 32/24 L -10 42 -5 3.91 5 
 24 L -4 -10 30 5.96 55 
 24 L -2 -25 34 3.87 7 
Insula 13 L -32 28 17 7.01 65 
 13 R 34 20 6 4.08 6 
 13 R 42 4 -4 3.81 9 
Other        
Caudate  R 20 7 16 3.87 9 
Globus pallidus  R 22 -10 -5 5.51 38 
Globus pallidus  R 12 -2 -8 4.28 13 
Cerebellum  R 2 -70 0 4.83 36 
Thalamus  R 6 -31 -2 3.79 5 
Specific AM Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Negative Correlation 
no regions survived p < .001 
140 
 
 Elaboration Phase.  As with the onset phase, the contrast examining specific 
versus sentence elaboration, while controlling for reappraisal and suppression individual 
differences, revealed activity in several regions associated with the AM retrieval network 
(Fig. 3.3b; Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Svoboda et al., 2006).  There was extensive 
activity throughout the PFC, particularly in medial PFC (BA 11) and left superior frontal 
gyrus (BA 8).  Specific memory elaboration also engaged regions in the MTL, including 
left hippocampus, right parahippocampal gyrus, and right amygdala, and in bilateral 
temporal lobes (BAs 21, 22, and 38), to a greater extent than sentence elaboration.  
Bilateral anterior (BAs 24 and 25) and posterior cingulate (BAs 29 and 31) were engaged 
more by specific memory elaboration, as were several posterior regions, including left 
precuneus (BA 31), left angular gyrus (BA 39), and right superior occipital gyrus (BA 
19). 
 The pattern of regions whose activity was positively correlated with reported 
reappraisal scores during specific memory elaboration was somewhat similar to that 
during specific memory onset (Table 3.4; Fig. 3.3b).  In particular, higher reappraisal 
scores continued to be associated with greater prefrontal activity, particularly throughout 
right ventral (BA 47) and left dorsal (BAs 44/45) lateral PFC, as well as in left superior 
frontal gyrus (BA 8) and bilateral inferior parietal lobe (BA 40).  Higher reappraisal 
frequency also continued to be associated with left MTL activity, in parahippocampal 
gyrus.  Unlike in the specific memory onset phase, reappraisal was positively correlated 
with extensive activity in primarily left-lateralized lateral temporal lobe (BAs 21, 37, 38, 
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and 39), bilateral cuneus (BA 19), and right lingual gyrus (BA 39) in the specific memory 
elaboration phase.     
 In contrast to the number of regions that were positively correlated with 
reappraisal scores, lower reappraisal scores were associated with greater neural activity 
only in a bilateral region of dorsolateral PFC (BA 9). 
Table 3.4.  Regions in which neural activity was positively or negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency during specific AM elaboration (vs. baseline sentence task 
elaboration).    
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
Specific AM Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 R 30 11 -11 4.69 20 
 47 R 32 30 -12 4.40 15 
 44/45 L -48 20 17 4.35 12 
 45 L -55 24 6 4.25 11 
 44 L -36 11 23 4.12 8 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 L -8 54 41 4.26 46 
Temporal        
Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 R 55 -68 2 4.44 34 
 37 L -55 -49 -11 4.15 6 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 L -42 -75 15 5.54 115 
 21 L -46 -29 -5 4.57 17 
 19 R 44 -79 19 3.80 7 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 42 L -53 -19 6 4.32 5 
 39 L -59 -63 29 4.12 8 
 38 L -50 15 -9 4.69 28 
Medial Temporal        
Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 L -32 -30 -17 5.37 102 
Occipital        
Lingual Gyrus 18 R 14 -76 -1 4.46 33 
Cuneus 19 R 16 -88 27 4.67 24 
 19 L -14 -92 27 4.33 20 
 19 R 8 -76 31 3.77 8 
142 
 
Parietal        
Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 L -32 -48 43 4.75 43 
 40 L -48 -58 53 4.00 6 
 40 R 42 -36 28 3.83 8 
Supramarginal Gyrus 40 L -59 -47 28 4.29 44 
Postcentral Gyrus 3 L -63 -19 40 4.93 10 
Other        
Caudate  R 16 24 4 4.28 5 
  R 18 13 18 3.81 11 
Cerebellum  R 26 -28 -20 4.92 62 
Putamen  L -26 -13 12 4.16 14 
Specific AM Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Superior frontal gyrus 9 L -24 36 28 5.30 57 
Middle frontal gyrus 9 R 24 41 35 3.92 6 
Other        
Cerebellum  R 12 -24 -21 4.21 9 
 
General AM Recall vs. Sentence Baseline 
 Onset Phase.  When controlling for individual differences in reappraisal and 
suppression frequencies, general AMs also recruited several regions previously 
associated with AM retrieval (Fig. 3.3c; Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Svoboda et al., 
2006).  Activity was evident in medial PFC (BA 10) and dACC (BA 32), as well as in 
right parahippocampal gyrus and bilateral middle (BA 21) and superior (BAs 22 and 39) 
temporal gyri.  General AM onset also engaged bilateral insula (BA 13) and posterior 
regions like left precuneus (BA 31), right lingual gyrus (BA 18), and bilateral occipital 
gyri (BAs 18 and 19).   
 When examining which regions were associated with greater reappraisal 
frequency during general AM onset, the results were similar to those revealed during 
specific AM onset.  There was an extensive amount of activity when examining which 
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regions were associated with greater reappraisal frequency (see Table 3.5; Fig. 3.3c), 
particularly throughout the PFC in medial (BAs 6 and 10), dorsolateral (BAs 9, 44, and 
45/46) and ventrolateral (BAs 11 and 47) regions, as well as in dACC (BA 32), 
throughout the lateral temporal lobes (BAs 21, 22, 37, and 39), and in right-lateralized 
hippocampus and insula (BA 13).   Reappraisal scores were further associated with 
greater activity in bilateral posterior cingulate (BAs 23, 24, and 31), bilateral superior 
parietal lobe (BA 7), and bilateral precuneus (BA 7) during general AM recall. 
 Consistent with the patterns of activity during specific AM recall, activity in only 
a small region of cerebellum was negatively correlated with reappraisal scores. 
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Table 3.5.  Regions in which neural activity was positively or negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency during general AM onset (vs. baseline sentence task onset).    
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
General Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Positive Correlation 
Frontal        
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45/46 R 40 35 4 6.83 35 
 44 R 61 10 14 5.94 34 
 44 R 50 3 26 5.58 89 
 44 R 32 3 29 5.77 135 
 44/46 L -36 9 25 4.79 85 
 45 R 51 24 21 4.83 23 
 45 L -50 20 21 3.86 5 
 45/46 R 53 30 11 4.36 33 
 10/47 L -44 45 -2 5.65 74 
 47 L -42 31 0 4.8 23 
 47 L -53 27 -5 4.63 15 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 6 R 6 -11 52 5.33 122 
 10 L -4 55 19 4.49 56 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 L -36 42 26 8.36 241 
 10 R 36 62 1 5.69 17 
 6 L -44 4 50 5.18 29 
 6 L -38 14 45 4.39 5 
 9 R 32 45 36 5.13 270 
 9 L -26 21 38 4.32 7 
 11 R 42 54 -13 4.89 9 
 8 R 34 18 47 4.31 36 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 10 L -22 59 19 4.17 17 
 6 L -22 5 62 5.02 28 
 6 R 18 -8 67 4.9 8 
 6 R 18 14 56 4.78 57 
 8 L -12 28 56 4.71 50 
 8 R 8 36 50 3.81 14 
 10 R 26 58 -10 4.62 30 
 10 R 16 67 15 3.81 5 
Paracentral Lobule 5 L -14 -34 51 5.61 83 
Paracentral Lobule 5 R 4 -32 57 5.03 134 
Precentral Gyrus 4 L -16 -31 72 5.5 147 
 4 R 14 -30 70 4.93 193 
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 6 L -10 -18 69 4.58 12 
Temporal        
Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 R 61 -59 -7 4.59 10 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -48 -56 1 4.64 34 
 21 L -63 -18 -4 5.43 90 
 21 L -55 -33 -7 4.35 5 
 39 R 51 -73 11 4.65 20 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 R 51 -38 17 4.63 7 
 22 R 51 -29 3 7.6 453 
 21/22 R 63 -8 -1 6.15 51 
 22 L -59 -46 17 4.76 112 
Medial temporal        
Hippocampus  R 32 -31 -3 4.61 45 
Parietal        
Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 L -51 -42 56 3.75 5 
Superior Parietal Lobule 7 R 28 -52 54 4.32 16 
 7 R 30 -46 48 3.91 11 
 7 L -18 -49 60 4.17 5 
 7 L -28 -54 45 3.93 13 
Precuneus 7/31 L -14 -52 39 4.27 14 
 7 R 4 -73 48 5.35 251 
 7 R 16 -66 40 5.14 227 
Postcentral Gyrus 4/3 R 59 -16 24 4.81 49 
 7 R 14 -49 67 4.33 40 
 5 R 36 -40 65 4.29 14 
 3 R 22 -38 65 3.83 5 
Supramarginal Gyrus 40 L -61 -47 37 4.73 53 
Limbic        
Cingulate Gyrus 32/25 L -14 15 -7 4.65 35 
 10 R 16 45 3 5.25 24 
 24/32 L -4 26 8 4.09 5 
 31 R 6 -41 28 4.95 74 
 24 R 10 -4 35 4.15 5 
 23 L 0 -28 25 4.06 18 
 32 L -12 12 38 5.64 24 
Insula 13 R 36 2 -3 5.81 87 
Thalamus  L -14 -3 13 5.15 75 
Claustrum  R 34 -4 8 5.74 28 
General Onset > Sentence Onset:  Reappraisal Negative Correlation 
Cerebellum  R 4 -49 -14 4.00 12 
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 Elaboration Phase.  General AM elaboration continued to engage neural activity 
in medial PFC (BAs 9 and 10), left dorsolateral PFC (BA 9), dACC (BA 32), bilateral 
posterior cingulate (BAs 24, 29, 30, and 31), and bilateral temporal lobes (BAs 21, 38, 
and 39) (Fig. 3.3d).  In addition, general AM elaboration recruited bilateral hippocampal 
and left angular gyrus (BA 39) activity.   
 Compared to the general AM onset phase, relatively few regions were positively 
correlated with reappraisal scores (Table 3.6; Fig. 3.3d), though notably those regions 
that were positively correlated with reappraisal scores during general AM overlapped 
with regions showing this relation during specific AM elaboration.  Higher reported 
reappraisal was associated with greater activity in left hippocampus, right lingual gyrus 
(BA 18), and left cuneus (BA 17). 
 Also in contrast to the general AM onset phase were the several regions that were 
negatively correlated with reappraisal scores during the general AM elaboration phase 
(Table 3.6; Fig. 3.3d).  Lower reported reappraisal frequency was associated with greater 
activity in medial PFC (BAs 6, 8, and 10) and bilateral dACC (BA 32).  In addition, 
activity in right parahippocampal gyrus and left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) was 
negatively correlated with individual differences in reappraisal. 
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Table 3.6.  Regions in which neural activity was positively or negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency during general AM elaboration (vs. baseline sentence task 
elaboration).    
Lobe/Region BA Hemisphere Talairach t k 
   x y z   
General Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reapprasial Positive Correlation 
Medial temporal        
Hippocampus  L -32 -26 -5 4.32 16 
Occipital        
Cuneus 17 L -18 -89 8 3.90 9 
Lingual Gyrus 18 R 30 -68 3 4.68 6 
Parietal        
Postcentral Gyrus 5/7 R 20 -43 70 5.91 50 
Other        
Cerebellum  R 4 -34 -20 3.98 9 
Cerebellum  R 26 -45 -15 3.95 11 
General Elaboration > Sentence Elaboration:  Reapprasial Negative Correlation 
Frontal        
Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 R 8 62 2 4.46 16 
 8 R 2 27 45 4.28 11 
 6 R 18 3 57 4.28 7 
 6 L 0 14 47 3.98 17 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 L -20 7 62 4.60 63 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 11 R 24 44 -16 4.29 7 
Medial Temporal        
Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 R 38 -32 -9 4.80 28 
Parietal        
Inferior parietal lobe  40 L -42 -41 26 3.94 8 
Postcentral Gyrus 3/1 R 57 -11 47 4.10 10 
Limbic        
Cingulate gyrus 32 L -10 23 -8 5.82 24 
 32 R 16 30 19 3.92 7 
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Specific AMs > Sentence Baseline
General AMs > Sentence Baseline
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Memory Onset Phase Memory Elaboration Phase 
Regions positively correlated with reappraisal 
Regions negatively correlated with reappraisal 
a b 
c d 
Figure 3.3.  (a) Neural activity during the specific AM vs. sentence baseline onset phase. 
Saggital section shows a region of left amygdala (Tal:  x = -30, y = -6, z = -10) that was 
positively correlated with reappraisal frequency.  (b) Neural activity during the specific AM 
vs. sentence baseline elaboration phase.  Saggital section shows a region of left 
parahippocampal gyrus (Tal:  x = -32, y = -30, z =-17) that was positively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency.  (c) Neural activity during the general AM vs. sentence baseline onset 
phase.  Saggital section shows a region of right hippocampus (Tal:  x = 32, y = -31, z = -3) 
that was positively correlated with reappraisal frequency.  (d) Neural activity during the 
general AM vs. sentence baseline elaboration phase.  Saggital slice shows a region of right 
parahippocampal gyrus (Tal:  x = 38, y = -32, z = -9) that was negatively correlated with 
reappraisal frequency.  For all contrasts, regions in green were positively correlated with 
reported reappraisal frequency and regions in purple were negatively correlated with 
reported reappraisal frequency. Activity is significant at p < .001 and a 5-voxel threshold 
extent.  
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Specific vs. General AM Recall 
 Onset Phase.  We also directly compared the onset phases of specific and general 
AMs (Fig. 3.4a).  When controlling for individual differences in emotion regulation 
strategy use, the specific > general AM onset contrast revealed a pattern of activity 
similar to that previously reported when not including reappraisal and suppression scores 
as covariates (Holland, Addis, & Kensinger, 2011).  During the memory onset phase, 
specific AMs recruited greater left-lateralized activity in dorsolateral PFC (BA 46) and 
middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), and right-lateralized activity in dACC (BA 32).  Greater 
activity was also evident throughout the lateral temporal lobes (BAs 21, 22, and 39), as 
well as in left fusiform gyrus (BA 20), and in right-lateralized posterior regions [e.g., 
inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), cuneus (BA 18), and precuneus (BA 31)].  In contrast to 
this widespread activity when comparing specific > general AM onset, the general > 
specific onset contrast revealed activity in only a single region of left inferior parietal 
lobe (BA 40) when controlling for individual differences in emotion regulation strategy 
use (Fig. 3.4c).      
 Although specific AMs recruited a number of regions to a greater extent than 
general AMs during the memory onset phase, there were no regions associated with the 
specific > general AM onset contrast that were positively correlated with reappraisal 
frequency, consistent with the overall more extensive activity positively correlated with 
the general AM > sentence onset than specific AM > sentence onset contrasts.  In 
contrast, several regions were positively correlated with reappraisal scores in the general 
> specific AM onset contrast (Fig. 3.4c), including right ventrolateral (BA 45) bilateral 
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dorsolateral (BAs 9 and 46) PFC, right frontal pole (BA 10), and bilateral superior 
temporal gyri (BA 22).  Activity in a number of posterior regions was also positively 
correlated with general > specific AM onset, including bilateral posterior cingulate (BAs 
29 and 31), bilateral precuneus (BA 7), and right angular gyrus (BA 39).   
 Elaboration Phase.  When controlling for reappraisal and suppression scores 
during the AM elaboration phase, specific AMs recruited right medial PFC (BA 8), right 
superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), right parahippocampal gyrus, and left posterior 
cingulate (BA 31) to a greater extent than general AMs (Fig. 3.4b).  Consistent with the 
results reported in Holland et al. (2011), general AM elaboration recruited more 
prefrontal activity, particularly in left medial PFC (BA 6) and left superior frontal gyrus 
(BA 8) than specific AM elaboration, even when controlling for individual differences in 
emotion regulation strategies (Fig. 3.4d).  General AMs also engaged right-lateralized 
regions in middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and middle occipital gyrus (BA 18) to a 
greater extent than specific AM elaboration. 
 Although reappraisal frequency did not correlate with any regions during specific 
> general AM onset, greater reappraisal frequency was associated with greater activity in 
right middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), right insula (BA 13), right parahippocampal gyrus, and 
left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), posterior cingulate (BA 23) and precuneus (BA 31) 
during specific > general AM elaboration (Fig. 3.4b).  In contrast, reappraisal frequency 
was positively correlated with somewhat more prefrontal activity during general > 
specific AM elaboration, including bilateral superior frontal gyrus (BAs 6 and 8).  In 
addition, reported reappraisal frequency was linked to greater activity in left dACC (BA 
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32/24), left parahippocampal gyrus, right superior temporal gyrus (BA 38), and right 
inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) during general (vs. specific) AM elaboration (Fig. 3.4d).   
Specific AMs > General AMs
General AMs > Specific AMs
Memory Elaboration PhaseMemory Onset Phase
Regions positively correlated with reappraisal
Regions negatively correlated with reappraisal
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 2 Discussion 
 We examined how habitual reappraisal as reported on the ERQ was related to 
neural activity as individuals generated and elaborated upon specific and general AMs in 
a b 
c d 
Figure 3.4.  (a) Neural activity during the specific AM vs. general AM onset phase. (b) 
Neural activity during the specific AM vs. general AM elaboration phase.  (c) Neural 
activity during the general AM vs. specific AM onset phase.  (d) Neural activity during 
the general AM vs. specific AM elaboration phase.  For all contrasts, regions in green 
were positively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency and regions in purple 
were negatively correlated with reported reappraisal frequency. Activity is significant at 
p < .001 and a 5-voxel threshold extent.  
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response to generic cue words.  Our results indicated that regardless of event specificity, 
habitual reappraisal was positively associated with extensive activity in cognitive control 
regions in the PFC and dACC during the memory onset phase, a finding that is consistent 
with prior research demonstrating increased activity in these regions for habitual 
reappraisers during the processing of emotional information (e.g., Drabant et al., 2009; 
Modinos et al., 2010) as well as during instructed reappraisal tasks (Ochsner & Gross, 
2005; 2008).  Also consistent with prior research (Drabant et al., 2009) was the finding 
that chronic reappraisal was positively correlated with activity throughout the inferior 
(for specific AMs) and superior (for both specific and general AMs) parietal lobes as 
events were being generated.  These regions, along with regions of the posterior cingulate 
that were also positively related to reappraisal frequency, have been implicated in visual 
attention during instructed (Goldin et al., 2008; Exp. 2) or habitual (Drabant et al., 2009) 
reappraisal and with visuospatial processing during AM recall (Svoboda et al., 2006).  
One intriguing possibility is that chronic reappraisers modulate the sensory detail (and 
therefore neural activity in posterior sensory regions) associated with recall according to 
their chronic reappraisal goals, in a similar manner to the way that such modulation 
occurs for instructed goals (see Chapters 1 and 2).   
Interestingly, we found that regardless of event specificity there was greater 
hippocampal, amygdala, and insula activity during memory onset for individuals who 
reported more frequent everyday reappraisal.  At first glance this finding may seem 
inconsistent with the findings from Experiment 1 suggesting reduced amygdala and 
insula activity during the negative memory onset phase for higher chronic reappraisal;  
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however, because the memories recalled in this study were not constrained to being 
negative or even emotional in nature, increased activity in these emotion-related regions 
may reflect more general appraisal and emotional generative processes for individuals 
who chronically use reappraisal.  We also cannot rule out the possibility that the events 
recalled in this experiment were more positive than the events recalled in Experiment 1; 
if this were the case, then individuals may be motivated to increase the emotional 
intensity of these events in line with habitual hedonic goals (see Tamir & Gross, 2011), 
thereby resulting in increased activity in emotional processing regions.  
Unlike in Experiment 1, habitual reappraisal in the present study was associated 
with neural activity not only during the onset phase but also during the elaboration phase, 
perhaps due to differences in memory cueing (i.e., more direct access to AMs via 
personalized memory cues in Experiment 1 vs. more generative retrieval via generic cues 
here).  Although higher habitual reappraisal was associated with similar patterns of 
activity in the frontal, parietal, and medial temporal lobes during the onset phases of both 
specific and general AMs (vs. a baseline task), results during the later elaboration phase 
were more divergent depending on event specificity.  During specific AM elaboration, 
higher reappraisal continued to be associated with increased activity throughout lateral 
PFC and inferior parietal cortex, as well as in the parahippocampal gyrus.  In addition, 
reappraisal was positively correlated with posterior activity (e.g., in the cuenus) that has 
previously been associated with the processing of vivid details during AM elaboration 
(Daselaar et al., 2008), perhaps also reflecting modulation of sensory details in line with 
chronic reappraisal goals (as discussed above).  During general AM elaboration, higher 
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reappraisal was also associated with some activity in the hippocampus, cuneus, and 
lingual gyrus, similar to the relation between reappraisal and activity during specific AM 
elaboration.  However, lower reappraisal was associated with a more extensive pattern of 
regions, including medial PFC and dACC during general event elaboration.   
These differences during the elaboration phase may reflect behavioral differences 
between specific and general events.  For example, we found that specific events were 
rated as more detailed than general events (see also Holland et al., 2011), in line with the 
hypothesis that specific events are more cognitively demanding to recall (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Due to the greater cognitive demands of generating specific 
AMs, there may be fewer executive resources available during the onset phase that can be 
devoted to chronic regulation goals; executive resources may be particularly taxed for 
individuals who chronically use reappraisal, a trait that we found to be positively 
correlated with the reported level of detail for specific AMs.  As a consequence, 
prefrontal regions positively correlated with chronic reappraisal continue to be engaged 
throughout the specific memory elaboration phase.  On the other hand, because general 
AMs are less detailed and less demanding to recall, there may be sufficient resources 
available during the general AM onset phase for habitual reappraisal-related activity; as a 
consequence, individuals who use reappraisal less frequently (and therefore perhaps less 
efficiently) engage a more widespread pattern of activity in regulation-related areas of 
medial PFC and dACC during the elaboration phase.  More work is needed to clarify the 
role of habitual emotion regulation strategies in specific versus general AM recall, 
particularly given evidence that individuals with clinical disorders may chronically recall 
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general AMs, perhaps as a way to avoid recalling specific, painful details (e.g., Williams 
et al., 2007).   
General Discussion 
We examined the relation between the chronic use of cognitive reappraisal, an 
emotion regulation strategy that involves reinterpreting information in a less emotional 
light, and the neural activity during AM recall.  Consistent with prior examinations of 
both chronic (Drabant et al., 2009; Modinos et al., 2010) and instructed (Ochsner et al., 
2005; 2008) reappraisal, higher reported use of reappraisal was linked to greater activity 
in cognitive control regions of the lateral PFC and dACC during AM onset, regardless of 
event valence (i.e., negative or neutral), event specificity (i.e., specific or general), or 
cueing technique (i.e., personalized or generic cues).  In addition to these general 
similarities, however, important task-dependent differences emerged.  For example, 
contrary to prior work examining the relation between individual differences in 
regulation strategies and neural activity while viewing negative images (e.g., Drubant et 
al., 2009), higher habitual reappraisal was also linked to reduced activity in PFC and 
emotion processing regions during negative AM onset, but increased emotion processing 
activity when the emotionality of the events was not constrained.  When events were 
elicited via self-generated, personal cues, chronic reappraisal was positively correlated 
with activity primarily during the memory onset phase.  When events were elicited via 
generic cues, chronic reappraisal was positively correlated with activity during both the 
specific onset and elaboration phases, as well as the general onset phase, but negatively 
correlated with activity during the general elaboration phase. Taken together, these 
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findings provide the first evidence that chronic emotional goals can influence not only the 
behavioral characteristics of AM recall (Rubin & Siegler, 2004; D‘Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2005; Comblain et al., 2005) but also the neural regions that are engaged during 
recall.   
As with investigations into the links between instructed reappraisal and AM 
recall, examinations into the links between chronic reappraisal and AM recall are ripe for 
future research.  For example, because participants did not know in advance in either 
study what type of memory they would be asked to recall on a given trial (e.g., in 
Experiment 1 participants only received a ―maintain‖ instruction prior to either a negative 
or neutral memory prompt, and in Experiment 2 the generated events were unconstrained 
in their emotionality), one open question is how habitual reappraisal might interact with 
an instructed goal state.  For example, if chronic reappraisers knew that an upcoming 
memory cue would be negative, they might be more likely to prepare to regulate their 
responses during the instruction phase than individuals who use reappraisal less 
frequently.  It also remains to be seen how habitual reappraisal might be associated with 
neural activity during positive AM recall.  Because individuals are often motivated to 
regulate their emotions in a hedonic direction (e.g., increase positive emotions; Tamir & 
Gross, 2011), it is possible that chronic reappraisal might be linked to greater PFC and 
emotion processing (e.g., in the insula or amygdala) activity during positive AM recall.   
It will also be important for future work to consider how individual differences in 
habitual emotion regulation use might influence neural activity in individuals with 
clinical diagnoses or who are at risk for developing clinical disorders.  Depressed 
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individuals report using cognitive reappraisal less frequently in everyday life (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; see also Ehler et al., 2010), leaving open the possibility that they would 
engage lateral and medial PFC regions to a lesser extent and/or emotion processing 
regions to a greater extent compared to healthy individuals during AM onset, particularly 
when not explicitly given reappraisal instructions.  Indeed, such a pattern of neural 
activity may reflect an inability to spontaneously down-regulate negative affect, which in 
turn may be a risk factor for the development and maintenance of affective disorders like 
depression (see also Abler et al., 2007).  
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Discussion 
Taken together, the experiments presented in this thesis illustrate that emotion 
regulation goals can influence the construction of autobiographical memories, both from 
a behavioral and neural standpoint.  These experiments extend prior research 
demonstrating that regulatory goals can influence the content of recall (e.g., Holland, 
Tamir, & Kensinger, 2010) by revealing that being instructed to cognitively reappraise 
the emotions associated with events can also influence the subjective experiences 
associated with recall (Chapter 1).  Additionally, reappraisal instructions can modulate 
neural activity during recall (Chapter 2), though the time course of this modulation 
appears to depend on whether individuals are attempting to down- or up-regulate their 
emotions:  Down-regulation primarily engages neural activity as individuals are initially 
searching for the events referenced by personalized memory cues.  On the other hand, up-
regulation engages neural activity during an instruction phase prior to the presentation of 
a memory cue as well as later on as the details of memories are being elaborated upon.   
In addition to the effect of instructed or short-term emotion regulation goals on 
memory recall, habitual or long-term goals measured by the reported frequency of 
cognitive reappraisal can also modulate neural activity during recall (Chapter 3).  When 
recalling either specific or general AMs in response to either personalized or generic 
cues, higher reappraisal was positively associated with activity in cognitive control-
related regions in the prefrontal cortex, consistent with these regions‘ role in instructed 
cognitive reappraisal.   
165 
 
 The results presented here add to both the autobiographical memory and emotion 
regulation literatures.  First, they lend further support to the notion of goal-directed 
constructive recall put forth by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000; see also Conway, 
2005).  The findings from all three experiments suggest that short- and long-term emotion 
regulation goals may be active within the construct of the ―working self‖ that is thought 
to guide the construction of AMs.  More broadly, these experiments also speak to the 
malleability of memory recall; even over a relatively short delay of 1 week, the subjective 
experiences associated with recall were modulated between the baseline and regulation 
sessions (Chapters 1 and 2).  Although it is tempting to view such malleability as 
problematic, the ability to flexibly reappraise and/or update the details of memories may 
be a critical function of memory (see Levine, Safer & Lench, 2006; Holland & 
Kensinger, 2010; Schacter & Addis, 2007, for similar discussion), perhaps allowing us to 
maintain or enhance positive emotions while also downplaying negative emotions.  In 
addition to contributing to the literature on the constructive nature of AM, these 
experiments provide the emotion regulation literature with a new task that uses a more 
ecologically valid, personally-relevant set of stimuli that can complement investigations 
using more controlled normative images and film clips.   
Future Directions 
As I have highlighted throughout this thesis, there are a number of open questions 
that follow from the experiments presented here.  For example, it remains to be seen how 
durable changes in memory construction are following an instructed emotion regulation 
task, at either a behavioral level (e.g., do changes in emotional intensity remain stable 
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over delays following an emotion regulation session?) or a neural level (e.g., are negative 
AMs that have previously been down-regulated recalled with less amygdala activity than 
negative AMs that have previously been up-regulated?).  Additionally, future work can 
further constrain the characteristics of the AMs that participants recall to examine the 
influence of memory age (e.g., are remote vs. recent events more susceptible to 
regulation-related changes?) or discrete emotions on instructed regulation success and 
durability.   
In addition to modulating the nature of AMs used in regulation tasks, future work 
can also compare the utility and durability of different emotion regulation strategies on 
autobiographical recall.  Although I focused on how cognitive reappraisal instructions 
can influence AM construction, it is likely that other strategies such as mentally 
distancing oneself from an emotional event (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011) or suppressing 
one‘s behavioral reactions (e.g., facial expressions; Gross, 1998) to the recall of an 
emotional event, modulate AM construction.  In addition, though the experiments 
presented in this thesis focused on either instructed or habitual use of cognitive 
reappraisal, it is likely that there are interactions between these short- and long-term goals 
during AM recall.  For instance, individuals who report more frequently using cognitive 
reappraisal in their everyday lives may be at an advantage when instructed to use similar 
strategies in an experimental setting, reflected in greater instructed reappraisal success 
and/or in greater cortical control over sub-cortical emotion processing regions.  
 The work presented here also has important implications for clinical populations 
with affective disorders like depression or post-traumatic stress disorder.  As noted in 
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Chapter 2, these clinical disorders are often associated with deficits in both AM and in 
emotion regulation abilities (see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010, for review).  The behavioral 
and neuroimaging methodologies employed in this thesis can be used to investigate 
whether these impairments are linked.  If clinical populations are unable to successfully 
decrease the emotional intensity associated with negative events, either spontaneously or 
when explicitly instructed to do so, this may shed light on some of the contributing 
causes of and possible treatment options for their disorders.   
Conclusions 
In sum, these experiments provide evidence that emotion regulation goals are among 
other self-relevant goals that can guide the construction of AMs.  The presence of short- 
and long-term emotion regulation goals at the time of recall can influence the behavioral 
and neural correlates associated with AMs, suggesting that there is an intimate coupling 
between our present emotional goals and how we remember the past. 
  
168 
 
References 
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and Language, 53, 594-
628.  
Conway M. A. & Pleydell-Pearce C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261-288.  
Gotlib, I.H. & Joormann, J.  (2010).  Cognition and depression:  Current status and future 
directions.  Annual Review in Clinical Psychology, 6, 285-312. 
Gross, J.J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. 
Review of General Psychology, 2, 271-299. 
Holland, A.C. & Kensinger, E.A. (2010). Emotion and autobiographical memory. Physics 
of Life Reviews, 7, 88-131. 
Holland, A.C., Tamir, M., & Kensinger, E.A. (2010). The effect of regulation goals on 
emotional event specific knowledge. Memory, 18, 504-521.  
Kross, E. & Ayduk, O.  (2011).  Making meaning out of negative experiences by self-
distancing.  Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 187-191. 
Levine, L.J., Safer, M.A., Lench, H.C.  (2006).  Remembering and misremembering 
emotions. In: Sanna LJ, Chang EC, editors. Judgments over time: The interplay of 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (pgs. 271-290). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schacter, D.L. & Addis, D.R.  (2007).  The ghosts of past and future: A memory that 
works by piecing together bits of the past may be better suited to simulating future 
events than one that is a store of perfect records. Nature, 445, 7123-7127. 
 
